Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After Action Report, April 27, 2009 by unknown
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
 
 
IOWA 2008 SUMMER STORMS 
AFTER-ACTION REPORT 
Final 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally blank. 
 
  
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
 
 
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS 
This document—the Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report—is unclassified.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the summer of 2008, the state of Iowa suffered from a series of severe storms that produced 
tornadoes and heavy rainfall, which resulted in widespread flooding.  The Summer Storms1 
lasted from late May through mid-August, with the most intense storms occurring over a month-
long period from May 25 to June 25.  The Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic 
toll on Iowa, resulting in 18 fatalities and 106 injuries, forcing the evacuation of approximately 
38,000 Iowans, and impacting 21,000 housing units.   
 
Iowa’s public and private sectors suffered significant monetary damages.  Eighty-six of the 
ninety-nine counties in the state were included in the Governor’s disaster declarations.  
Presidential disaster declarations made residents in 84 counties eligible for Public Assistance and 
78 counties for Individual Assistance.  The Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission estimated 
$798.3 million in damages to publicly owned buildings and infrastructure, including damages of 
$53 million to public transportation and $342 million to public utilities. 
 
The 2008 Summer Storms presented unique coordination challenges for the Iowa Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) and the State Emergency Operations 
Center (SEOC).  These challenges arose from three interrelated factors: the large number of local 
jurisdictions and areas impacted, the prolonged period of time that response operations were 
conducted, and the increasing complexity of overall response operations.  These events caused 
the SEOC to coordinate response, mitigation, recovery, and preparedness operations 
simultaneously.  
 
HSEMD and the SEOC implemented a variety of measures to enhance their ability to coordinate 
operations and assistance to localities.  The SEOC expanded its organizational structure, 
implemented innovative techniques, and incorporated new partners into its activities.  These 
steps enabled HSEMD and SEOC to coordinate operations more effectively, which undoubtedly 
helped save lives and property, while mitigating the effects of the 2008 Summer Storms. 
 
Research Scope and Process 
 
HSEMD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII recognized that 
the lessons learned and other knowledge gleaned from the 2008 Summer Storms would be 
invaluable for the state of Iowa and its localities as well as for the nation’s homeland security 
professionals.  The FEMA National Preparedness Directorate’s National Exercise Division 
offered use of its Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) program to assist in the 2008 
Summer Storms after-action review.  This review focuses on HSEMD and SEOC 
communications and coordination with affected counties, state agencies, the private sector, and 
FEMA Region VII.  The review concentrates on the period from May 25 through June 25, 2008.  
This period encompasses response operations and captures the transition to recovery operations.  
                                                 
 
1 This after-action report uses “Summer Storms” to describe the storms collectively, although they were actually a 
series of interrelated incidents that had a cumulative impact on Iowa.     
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This review does not examine the actions of counties and should not be considered to serve as a 
substitute for any county or local after-action review effort. 
 
HSEMD, FEMA Region VII, and LLIS.gov held an after-action conference on August 18, 2008, 
to gain insights from federal, state, and local officials involved in preparing for and responding 
to the 2008 Summer Storms.  LLIS.gov conducted additional interviews and reviewed available 
documentation to supplement the after-action conference.  These efforts have culminated in this 
After-Action Report (AAR).  This AAR employs the structure and approaches recommended by 
the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.    
 
Findings 
 
This AAR presents detailed findings about SEOC coordination activities related to the Summer 
Storms.  These findings describe both the strengths of and opportunities for improvements to 
SEOC processes and operations.  The AAR is organized according to the following topics: 
 
 SEOC Operations 
 Coordination with Incident Sites  
 Resource Management 
 Information Sharing and Communications 
 Public Information 
 Mass Care 
 Volunteer and Donations Management 
 
Major Strengths 
 
This AAR identifies the following as major strengths that were demonstrated during the 2008 
Summer Storms: 
 
 The SEOC activated Logistics and Planning Sections that enabled it to coordinate 
response operations and support to the affected localities; 
 HSEMD and the SEOC effectively utilized the Iowa Incident Management Team (IA-
IMT) and other field liaisons to assist localities and to promote situational awareness; 
 The SEOC successfully adapted its processes to incorporate an unprecedented number of 
federal, state, and private sector representatives.  
 
Primary Areas for Improvement 
 
This AAR identifies the following as primary areas for improvement that were demonstrated 
during the 2008 Summer Storms: 
 
 HSEMD should develop standard operating procedures (SOP) to help guide the role, 
activation, operations, and deactivation of the Logistics and Planning Sections as well as 
the Executive Office Support Staff; 
 HSEMD should build upon the experience of the Summer Storms to refine, expand, and 
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institutionalize the IA-IMT and field liaison initiatives; 
 HSEMD should establish protocols and SOPs to govern information sharing among 
SEOC Sections, the Joint Information Center, the Executive Office Support Staff, and 
other elements during activations. 
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND DISASTER OVERVIEW 
1.1  Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
 
The Governor of Iowa is responsible for the protection and well-being of the state’s citizens.  In 
2007, Governor Chet Culver appointed Lieutenant Governor Patty Judge to serve as his 
homeland security advisor and to oversee all Iowa homeland security activities.  The state of 
Iowa Department of Public Defense, comprised of the Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management Division (HSEMD) and the Iowa National Guard, reports to Lt. Governor Judge in 
her capacity as the Governor’s homeland security advisor. 
 
HSEMD serves as the main coordinating body for homeland security and emergency 
management throughout the state.  The Division supports the Governor’s Strategic Plan for the 
State of Iowa by ensuring that counties and local jurisdictions are prepared for natural disasters 
or terrorist attacks.  The HSEMD Administrator works closely with the Lieutenant Governor’s 
Office on a range of homeland security and emergency management initiatives.  The 
Administrator also ensures that Iowa meets security standards to remain eligible for homeland 
security funding through national grants.2  
 
 
Figure 1 – The Homeland Security Structure in Iowa 
 
                                                 
 
2 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, State Fiscal Years 2006 – 2007,  2008, p. 8-9, 
 http://iowahomelandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Newsroom/Publications/HSEMD%20AR%200607.pdf. 
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HSEMD consists of five bureaus: Homeland Security, Grants Management, Communications 
and Technology, Preparedness, and Readiness and Response.  Each bureau is headed by a chief 
who reports directly to the HSEMD Chief of Staff.  The Chief of Staff and the Homeland 
Security coordinator report to the Division Administrator.  HSEMD partners with state agencies 
to ensure county and local jurisdictions have sufficient support during natural disasters and other 
emergencies.  
 
1.2  The State Emergency Operations Center 
 
The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) is the state of Iowa’s central command center 
for managing incidents.  Representatives from over 45 state and private agencies staff the SEOC 
to coordinate state response and recovery efforts in support of local incidents.  The SEOC is 
organized in accordance with Incident Command System principles and includes four Sections: 
Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. 
 
The SEOC employs a tiered system that has five Readiness Levels: 
 
Level I No incidents being reported; day-to-day business operations 
occurring; duty officer on-call. 
Level II An incident has been reported, but it is being handled at the local 
level; no state assistance is being requested.  
Level III Local officials have requested state assistance; however, no 
SEOC activation is necessary. 
Level IV Incident has escalated; SEOC has activated. 
Level V SEOC is fully operational; significantly more resources are 
necessary to meet the needs of the affected area.  The National 
Response Framework and/or the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact is activated. 
 
HSEMD activates the SEOC at Readiness Level IV.  The HSEMD Readiness and Response 
Bureau is responsible for the readiness of the SEOC.3  The Executive Office is responsible for 
staffing the SEOC.  During activations, Readiness and Response Bureau personnel serve as the 
initial staff for the Operations Section to begin coordination of response operations.  Additional 
Sections are activated, as necessary, depending on the requirements of the incident.  SEOC 
activations can last from a few hours for small incidents to several weeks for large-scale 
incidents.4  The SEOC has been located at the Camp Dodge Joint Force Headquarters in 
Johnston, Iowa, since 1994.  
                                                 
3 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division: Structure, 
http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/AboutUs/HSEMD/DivisionStructure/tabid/89/Default.aspx. 
 
4 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, State Fiscal Years 2006 – 2007,  2008, p. 10, 
 http://iowahomelandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Newsroom/Publications/HSEMD%20AR%200607.pdf. 
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Figure 2 - Iowa SEOC Seating Chart 
 
1.3  Lessons Learned: The 2007 Winter Storms 
 
The state of Iowa experienced two consecutive winter storms of historic severity during a week-
long span in late February and early March 2007.  The first storm struck Iowa on February 24, 
bringing freezing rain and sleet to eastern and central parts of the state.  The second storm 
arrived 5 days later, blanketing central and western portions of Iowa with blizzard conditions and 
record snowfalls in some areas.  The storms destroyed electrical lines and caused roads to 
become ice covered, creating unsafe driving conditions.  The amount of ice accumulation 
necessitated the closure of roads and the re-routing of traffic.  Over 134,000 Iowans lost power 
during the 2 storms.  The severe weather also forced hundreds of residents to seek refuge in the 
265 emergency shelters or warming centers that were opened during this incident.  Overall, the 
storms caused a combined $65 million in state and federally reimbursed damages, a total that, at 
the time, was second only to the destruction caused by the floods of 1993.5   
 
                                                 
5 State of Iowa Response Coordination., Winter Storm: Ice, Snow & Blizzard After-Action Report,  2007, p. 40. 
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The SEOC worked with federal, state, and local agencies to coordinate simultaneous response 
and recovery operations across the state during the hazardous conditions.  Joint operations 
between public and private entities became the norm as resources and personnel were pushed to 
their limit to mitigate the storms’ impact on Iowa.  SEOC operations officers coordinated search 
and rescue efforts to aid stranded motorists.  Public information personnel notified communities 
affected by road closures.  The SEOC also provided communities with shelter supplies to meet 
the growing number of displaced citizens.  The SEOC directed 9-1-1 call centers to disseminate 
emergency public information after traditional modes failed due to the loss of electricity.  The 
SEOC was activated for the duration of the winter storms from February 24 through March 3.   
 
HSEMD conducted an after-action review to capture lessons learned about SEOC processes from 
the response to the winter storms.6  Several of these lessons proved critical for SEOC operations 
during the 2008 Summer Storms, including:      
  
Comprehensive Planning.  The after-action review concluded that no coordinated 
advanced planning took place between SEOC agencies.  SEOC operational forecasts 
typically addressed short-term issues within a 12 – 24-hour time period.  Issues beyond 
this time frame, particularly beyond a 48-hour time period, would not be included in the 
forecasts.  However, the winter storms demonstrated the need for longer term SEOC 
planning that spanned 7 days of statewide response operations.  The winter storms after-
action report (AAR) recommended that HSEMD “develop an interagency planning group 
inside the SEOC that will hold daily meetings to identify 36 hour+ issues and develop 
incident objectives for inclusion in upcoming Incident Action Plans.”  
 
HSEMD initiated discussions with relevant state agencies to develop a Planning Section 
concept for long-term SEOC response operations.  HSEMD held a 3-hour tabletop 
exercise with state agencies on March 25, 2008, to establish a template for the Planning 
Section.  Participants included personnel from HSEMD, the Department of Public Health, 
the Department of Transportation, the Iowa National Guard, and the Department of 
Public Safety.  From this exercise, HSEMD developed a series of action items to 
formalize the Planning Section concept more fully. 
  
Supporting the SEOC Executive Office.  During the 2007 winter storms, Lt. Governor 
Judge and the HSEMD Administrator staffed the Executive Office at the SEOC.  They 
maintained the on-site executive decision-making roles when Governor Culver was not 
present.  Governor Culver operated at the SEOC as weather permitted and when he was 
not visiting areas affected by the storms.  This enabled the Governor to issue clear 
mission statements directly to agency administrators and to obtain the necessary 
information about response operations.  The Governor’s presence at the SEOC marked a 
departure from previous governors, who typically visited the SEOC but did not operate 
from it.  The SEOC’s winter storm AAR found that the Executive Office required a 
dedicated staff to help manage the flow of conference calls and briefings and to redirect 
public information requests.  The AAR recommended that the SEOC “provide additional 
                                                 
 
6 State of Iowa Response Coordination, Winter Storm: Ice, Snow & Blizzard After-Action Report, 2007. 
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dedicated support to gather and present information necessary for enhancing a common 
operating picture for the Executive Office.”7       
 
Situational Awareness.  The SEOC had difficulty acquiring the necessary information 
from localities to maintain situational awareness during the storms.  The accumulation of 
ice disrupted the majority of Iowa’s power grid and caused power outages for one-third 
of the state’s electrical customers.8  Localities and residents opened community buildings 
or fire stations as unplanned shelters to meet the urgent demand.  Some of these facilities 
proved “less than optimal” as shelters.9  Further, county emergency managers and the 
SEOC were often unaware of shelters needing assistance during the storm.  Eventually, 
county coordinators gathered information about shelters in need.  The winter storms AAR 
noted that close coordination with appropriate agencies would be needed to maintain 
awareness of local developments. 
 
Several natural disasters struck Iowa from March 2007 to May 2008, which resulted in five 
presidential declarations being issued for various counties: 
   
 Heavy snow affected 30 counties from February 28 to March 2, 2007 (FEMA 3275-EM); 
 Severe storms, flooding, and tornadoes affected 19 Iowa counties from May 5 to May 7, 
2007 (FEMA 1705-DR); 
 Severe storms and flooding affected 17 counties from August 17 to September 5, 2007 
(FEMA 1727-DR); 
 Severe winter storms and ice affected 30 counties from December 10 to December 11, 
2007 (FEMA 1737-DR). 
 
HSEMD adopted many of the lessons learned from these disasters and from the 2007 winter 
storms.  While not all corrective actions had been fully implemented by May 2008, the steps 
taken by HSEMD enabled it to coordinate operations more effectively, which undoubtedly 
helped save lives and property, while mitigating the effects of the 2008 Summer Storms. 
 
1.4  Disaster Overview: The 2008 Summer Storms 
 
The Summer Storms began on May 25, 2008, when an Enhanced Fujita (EF)-5 tornado struck 
the cities of Parkersburg, Dunkerton, and New Hartford, killing 8 people.  Parkersburg officials 
initiated response operations and evacuated the city that evening.  The tornado destroyed 296 
buildings and caused estimated damages of more than $3 million.  The magnitude of the damage 
led HSEMD to activate the SEOC to coordinate state assistance to the incident response 
operations.  Governor Culver immediately issued a disaster proclamation for Blackhawk, 
Buchanan, Butler, and Delaware counties.  Based upon experience from prior exercises with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII, Governor Culver requested that 
President George Bush issue an expedited declaration due to the magnitude and severity of the 
disaster.  The Governor did not anticipate the need for direct federal assistance and did not wish 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 18. 
8 Ibid., p. 35. 
 
9 Ibid., p. 28. 
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to wait for a joint federal-state preliminary damage assessment to be conducted.  On May 27, 
President Bush issued a Major Disaster Declaration (FEMA-1763-DR) for Butler County.  A 
second EF-2 tornado cell struck the town of Attica in Marion County on May 30, damaging 
dozens of homes and injuring at least 8 people.  Within a week, the tempo of response operations 
decreased to such a level that the SEOC deactivated on May 31.    
 
Figure 3 – National Weather Service Storm Map of the Parkersburg Tornado 
 
A series of severe storms began passing through Iowa on May 29, bringing high winds and 
heavy rain that caused flooding in low-lying areas.  HSEMD reactivated the SEOC on June 1 in 
preparation for additional heavy rainfall.  On June 2, the steady precipitation caused flooding in 
the Raccoon River near Des Moines, which quickly spread to adjacent counties in central and 
northern Iowa.  The National Weather Service issued warnings on June 6 that flood levels might 
reach levels of the 1993 floods.  On June 8, residents of New Hartford and Mason City evacuated 
as flood waters over-topped local dams and levees.  The next day, areas east of Butler County 
faced similar conditions that necessitated mass evacuations in Blackhawk County.  Six inches of 
rain over-topped an Upper Iowa River levee in the city of Decorah, causing some of the worst 
damage since the installation of levee system in the late 1940s.  By the evening of June 9, 
Governor Culver had issued disaster proclamations for 43 counties.   
 
Other Iowa cities experienced the threat of severe flooding on June 10 and 11.  The Cedar River 
crested at 24 feet and flooded the city of Vinton; flood waters incapacitated the town’s electrical 
plant and forced the evacuation of the Benton County jail.  Flood waters surged through Palo, a 
town just upstream of Cedar Rapids, and caused changes in communications methods at the 
state’s only nuclear power plant.  The flooding continued in Cedar Rapids and Waterloo; at one 
point, Cedar Rapids nearly became isolated from surface transportation when all bridges across 
 
Section 1: Background and Disaster Overview  15  
 
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
 
 
the Cedar River were closed except for Interstate 380.  Flooding spread to the southeast counties 
of Iowa on June 11. 
 
Timeline of Major Events during the Summer Storms 
May 25 An EF-5 tornado strikes the cities of Parkersburg, Dunkerton, and New Hartford and kills eight people. 
May 25 The Iowa SEOC is activated and staffed by HSEMD personnel. 
May 27 President George W. Bush issues Major Disaster Declaration DR-1763 for Butler County. 
May 29 Heavy rains begin to cause flooding in low-lying areas of Iowa. 
May 30 An EF-2 tornado strikes the town of Attica and injures 8 people. 
May 30 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Black Hawk, Buchanan, and Delaware counties.   
May 31 Response and recovery operations scale down and the SEOC is deactivated. 
June 1 The SEOC is activated in preparation for heavy rains. 
June 2 Steady rain causes flooding in Des Moines near the Raccoon River. 
June 8 Over-topping of levees cause the evacuation of Mason City and New Hartford. 
June 9 Flood waters breach levees around the city of Decorah. 
June 9 Iowa Governor Chet Culver issues state disaster proclamation for 43 Iowa counties.  
June 10 The Cedar River crests at 24 feet and floods the city of Vinton. 
June 10 Flooding in the city of Palo forces the evacuation of its residents and causes changes in communications methods at the state’s only nuclear power plant.  
June 11 An EF-3 tornado strikes a campsite in the town of Little Sioux and kills 4 Boy Scouts. 
June 13 Flood waters cause the evacuation of Des Moines and most of Polk County. 
June 13 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Adams, Page, Marion, Story, Tama, and Union counties, providing Individual Assistance to residents. 
June 14 
The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Benton, Bremer, Cerro Gordo, 
Fayette, Floyd, Hardin, Johnson, and Linn counties, providing Individual Assistance to 
residents. 
June 14 Over-topping of levees in southeastern Iowa force the evacuation of towns in Louisa and Des Moines counties. 
June 14 Water breaches a levee on the Iowa River and floods the towns of Oakville and Wapello.   
June 14 Flood waters converge on Columbus Junction and cause major damage to the city. 
June 16 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Cedar, Jones, Louisa, Muscatine, Polk, and Winneshiek counties, providing Individual Assistance to residents. 
June 20 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Hancock, Kossuth, Lee, Madison, Marshall, and Wapello counties, providing Individual Assistance to residents. 
June 21 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Boone, Franklin, Hamilton, Scott, and Wright counties, providing Individual Assistance to residents. 
June 22 The Presidential Disaster Declaration is expanded to cover Webster County, providing Individual Assistance to residents. 
June 25 The worst of the flooding and severe storms period ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Timeline of Events During the Iowa 2008 Summer Storms 
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Over the next 11 days, severe storms resulted in a second deadly tornado while flood waters 
progressed rapidly from the northern to the southern areas of the state.  A tornado swept through 
a Boy Scout camp in the western Iowa town of Little Sioux, killing four Scouts and injuring 
dozens more.  Des Moines officials issued evacuation notices for part of the city and most of 
Polk County on June 13.  Over the next 2 days, over-topping of levees in southeastern Iowa 
forced evacuations of several towns in Louisa County and Des Moines County.  Iowa City 
officials closed all downtown bridges due to significant flooding, as Johnson County residents 
undertook extensive mitigation efforts.  On June 14, flood waters from the Cedar and Iowa rivers 
converged around Columbus Junction and caused massive damage to that city as well as Wapello 
and Oakville before emptying into the Mississippi River.  By June 25, the worst of the severe 
storms and flooding began to recede, although some severe storms periodically occurred until 
mid-August.  
 
The 2008 Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic toll on Iowa.  The storms 
resulted in 18 fatalities, forced the evacuation of approximately 38,000 Iowans, and impacted 
21,000 housing units.  The state unemployment rate rose from 3.9% in May 2008 to 4.6% in 
August 2008.  Iowa homeowners were confronted with $946 million dollars in unmet home 
repair costs.10  The floods impacted approximately 4,800 non-manufacturing small businesses 
and 800 intermediate businesses for a net impact of $5.36 billion in assessed damages.  The 
Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission estimated $798.3 million in damages to publicly owned 
buildings and infrastructure as of August 11, 2008, including damages of $53 million to public 
transportation and $342 million to public utilities.11  Eighty-six of the ninety-nine counties in the 
state had been included in the Governor’s disaster declarations.  Presidential disaster declarations 
made residents in 84 counties eligible for Public Assistance and in 78 counties for Individual 
Assistance.  By October 2008, FEMA had provided over $400 million in Public Assistance to 
Iowans.12  Based upon these measures, the 2008 floods were comparable to the 1993 floods as 
the most destructive natural disasters in Iowa’s recent history.13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Public Law 110-252, “Utilizing Supplemental CDBG Disaster Recovery Funding from the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act,” Federal Register,  Vol. 72, No. 13, 2008, p. 1-2,  
http://www.iowalifechanging.com/community/downloads/Disaster_Recovery_Action_Plan_2_%20Draft.pdf. 
11 Rebuild Iowa Office, Infrastructure and Transportation Task Force Report, Aug 2008, 
 http://www.rio.iowa.gov/task_forces/infra-trans/infra-trans_report_08-2008.pdf. 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Governor Culver, FEMA Announce More Than $400 Million Has Been 
Granted to Iowa in Public Assistance Aid, Press Release, 28 Oct 2008,  
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=46512. 
 
13 In comparison, the historic 1993 floods resulted in 17 fatalities, the evacuation of over 100,000 residents, $1.45 
billion in losses to personal property and income, 21,000 damaged housing units, and the declaration of 99 counties 
under presidential disaster declarations. 
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The Iowa 2008 Summer Storms caused severe damage that approached the level of 
the historic 1993 flood, which had been the most destructive incident in state history.  
Initial damage statistics include:   
 
 18 fatalities 
 Approximately 38,000 Iowans evacuated 
 86 out of 99 counties included in the Governor’s disaster declarations. 
 $798.3 million in damages to publicly owned buildings and infrastructure 
 $53 million in damages to public transportation 
 $342 million in damages to public utilities 
 21,000 housing units impacted 
and 800 intermediate businesses 
 $946 million in unmet home repair costs 
 4,800 non-manufacturing small businesses 
impacted 
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Figure 4 - Map of Counties Covered by FEMA Emergency Declaration 1763 
Io
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SECTION 2: DETAILED FINDINGS 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This section presents detailed findings about the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 
coordination activities related to the Summer Storms.  It focuses on the May 25 to June 25 time 
period, when response operations were at their peak.  These findings describe both the strengths 
of and opportunities for improvements to SEOC processes and operations. 
 
2.2  State Emergency Operations Center Operations 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITIES: Emergency Operations Center Management 
 Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 Communications 
 Planning 
 
2.2.1  Operations Section 
 
The Chief of Operations has direct responsibility for coordinating the activities of all emergency 
response functions.14  The Chief is supported by the Operations Section, which manages all 
SEOC operations.  Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) 
personnel from the Readiness and Response Bureau manage the Operations Section, which 
functions as the decision-making and 
coordinating body for the SEOC.  The Operations 
Section tracks mission assignments and acts as a 
direct liaison for local emergency managers.  The 
Operations Section consists of HSEMD staff and 
representatives from state agencies and private 
partners.  The Section’s decision-making body is 
located at the Pit Table in the center of the 
Operations area.  State agency representatives and 
private sector partners support the Operations 
Section and complete tasks issued by it as 
necessary.  Figure 5 – Iowa SEOC Pit Table 
 
Observation 2.2.1.1: Area for Improvement: The Operations Section did not establish 
objectives for each operational period. 
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operations 
                                                 
 
14 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
A: Direction, Control, Coordination, 28 Mar 2003, p. A-6. 
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i. Task: Establish organization/operation of emergency operations 
center (EOC)/Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC)/Initial 
Operating Facility (IOF) (ResB1c 3.1) 
Analysis: The Operations Section focused only on immediate response for 
approximately the first 10 days of SEOC operations.  The Operations Section responded 
to resource requests as they came in by phone and WebEOC.  Objectives established by 
the Operations Section’s day shift differed from those established by the Section’s night 
shift.  This occurred, in part, due to the reduced staff available for the night shift.   
Recommendation:  
1. Ensure that objectives are developed for each operational period and that shifts 
coordinate their respective objectives. 
 
Observation 2.2.1.2: Area for Improvement: The Operations Section received questions 
about recovery issues while response operations were still underway.  
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operations 
i. Task: Transition from response to recovery (Res.B1c 3.7) 
Analysis: In previous disasters, the Operations Section has not usually addressed 
recovery questions.  During the 2008 Summer Storms, the progression of the incidents, 
especially the flooding, necessitated that response and recovery operations were 
conducted simultaneously.  Several SEOC staff observed that the initiation of recovery 
operations and the overlap with response operations did not occur in the most efficient 
manner possible.  For example, the Operations Section began receiving questions about 
county eligibility for Individual Assistance (IA) and Public Assistance (PA) as it was still 
coordinating response operations.  Issues related to program eligibility are not the role of 
the Operations Section and should have been referred to the appropriate recovery 
personnel for handling.  
Recommendations:  
1. Develop standard operating procedures (SOP) for expanding Operations Section 
participation during unique or extended duration incidents, including recovery 
operations. 
2. Develop processes for redirecting recovery inquiries to recovery personnel. 
3. Evaluate whether a recovery Operations liaison should be incorporated into the 
Operations Section staffing pattern. 
4. Promote awareness among county and local emergency managers about SEOC 
recovery operations procedures. 
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2.2.2  Planning Section  
 
SEOC officials identified the need for a Planning Section following the 2007 winter storms (See 
Section 1.3, Lessons Learned: The 2007 Winter Storms).  HSEMD conducted a Planning Section 
tabletop exercise (TTX) on March 25, 2008, which provided an opportunity for numerous state 
agencies to contribute to the Planning Section concept.  However, HSEMD had not fully 
developed Planning Section protocols and plans when the 2008 Summer Storms began.   
 
The SEOC activated the Planning Section on June 12.  The Planning Section included 
representatives from key agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the Iowa Department of Public Health (DPH), the Iowa Department of Public Safety 
(DPS), the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT), the Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR), the Iowa Utilities Board, American Red Cross (ARC), Safeguard Iowa 
Partnership (SIP) and the Iowa National Guard.  Three HSEMD personnel also staffed the 
Planning Section.  Initially, the Section conducted one to two coordination meetings per day.  
 
The Planning Section focused initially on the threat to critical infrastructure in Iowa City.  The 
Section directed its attention to the city’s water and sewer plants and the Iowa City boiler plant.  
A failure of this critical infrastructure would have adversely affected the University of Iowa 
Hospitals and Clinics and overall living conditions in the city.  The Planning Section maintained 
close contact with the University’s Public Safety Department to maintain situational awareness.  
Once boilers were identified in Illinois, the Section coordinated with the Iowa DOT to determine 
the best transportation route for the delivery trucks.  
 
The Planning Section then shifted its efforts to cities and facilities downstream from the 
flooding.  SEOC and National Guard field liaisons provided the Planning Section with up-to-date 
situational information.  The Section also coordinated with the Logistics Section to pre-position 
resources, such as sandbags, to ensure that local jurisdictions were adequately supplied.   
 
Observation 2.2.2.1: Strength: The Planning Section provided the SEOC with analyses of 
issues beyond the current operational period.  These analyses enhanced the quality of SEOC 
decision-making. 
References: 
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning  
2. National Incident Management System, Incident Command System 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Support identification and determination of potential hazards 
and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting (Res.B1c 
8.2.2) 
b. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
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i. Task: Provide direction, information, and/or support as appropriate 
to incident command/unified command and/or EOC/MACC/IOF 
(Res.B1c 8.1.1) 
Analysis: The Planning Section allowed multiple agencies to address issues beyond the 
current operational period and to share assets in a group setting.  This forward planning 
enabled the SEOC to anticipate events as the response to the 2008 Summer Storms 
unfolded.  Additionally, the Section coordinated with the National Guard’s planning 
section, which already had two liaisons in the field reporting back to the SEOC on how 
communities were preparing for the floods.   
 
The Planning Section also conducted scheduled conference calls with county EOCs to 
learn about plans they had in place.  When county EOCs were able to determine which 
areas would be flooded, the Planning Section was able to estimate how many people in 
the area would need sheltering.  The Planning Section integrated information from the 
National Guard liaisons with information from the conference calls to determine response 
measures when water reached certain critical levels.  The Logistics Section used this 
information to pre-position sandbags and pumps.  However, for a time, the Planning 
Section and the National Guard planning efforts worked independently (see Section 2.5, 
Information Sharing and Communications).   
Recommendation:  
1. Maintain multi-agency representation and participation in the Planning Section. 
 
Observation 2.2.2.2: Area for Improvement: The Planning Section did not achieve 
optimum effectiveness due to delayed activation, unclear mission, and limited operational 
guidance and personnel.  
References:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
b. Activity: Activate EOC/MACC/IOF 
i. Task: Activate the EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1c 4) 
2. Target Capabilities List, Planning 
a. Activity: Develop/Revise Operational Plans 
i. Task: Develop emergency operations/response plans that describe 
how personnel, equipment, and other government, non-
governmental, and private resources will support and sustain 
incident management requirements (ComA 2.4) 
Analysis: The SEOC did not activate the Planning Section until June 12, several days 
after the flooding began.  This prevented the SEOC from conducting long-term planning 
in the initial phases of the Summer Storms.  Once activated, the Planning Section had no 
dedicated staff to conduct its planning tasks.  Further, personnel who were familiar with 
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the Planning Section concept or had participated in the TTX were either unavailable or 
not assigned to the Section during the Summer Storms.  Consequently, some Planning 
Section personnel were unfamiliar with the role the Section should perform in the SEOC.  
Agency representatives’ inconsistent attendance at scheduled meetings proved to be 
problematic, particularly just after the Section was activated.  Previously established 
cells, such as the Iowa National Guard’s planning staff, worked independently from the 
SEOC Planning Section at first and hindered the Planning Section’s situational 
awareness.  Planning Section staff lacked clear guidance on its mission because a clear 
purpose and plan for oversight of the Section had not been established prior to the 
Summer Storms.   
Recommendations:  
1. Develop Planning Section SOPs and operational guidance that includes activation 
criteria and mission description.  
2. Identify and train SEOC staff members who will serve as members of the 
Planning Section.  These personnel should be dedicated to Planning Section 
operations during SEOC activations. 
 
Observation 2.2.2.3: Area for Improvement: The Planning Section encountered challenges 
in acquiring information about flood levels and critical infrastructure.   
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
a. Activity: Identify critical infrastructure (CI)/key resources (KR) 
i. Task: Identify CI/KR within the nation, region, state, or local area 
(Pro.A1a 4) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Support identification and determination of potential hazards 
and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting (Res.B1c 
8.2.2) 
Analysis: Unpredictable flood patterns, uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of flood 
mitigation efforts, and the inaccuracy of flood gauge readings presented difficulties for 
the Planning Section to provide planning support that focused beyond the current 
operational period.  The Planning Section lacked sufficient information about critical 
infrastructure in the Threat Information and Infrastructure Protection Program’s 
Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) portal, because that system is 
new and has not yet been populated with necessary information on critical assets and 
interdependencies.  To compensate for the lack of information in ACAMS, HSEMD’s 
infrastructure protection planner utilized 17 pre-identified sector leads to acquire updated 
information from utilities, local banks, and other local partners in coordination with the 
US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) protective security advisor.  The National 
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Guard helped to identify critical infrastructure interdependencies not shown by ACAMS; 
SIP assisted in collecting information about private sector critical assets.   
Recommendation:  
1. Continue to gather information related to critical infrastructure from county and 
local jurisdictions for incorporation into ACAMS. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Burlington’s Generating Station Surrounded by Flood Waters 
 
Observation 2.2.2.4: Area for Improvement: The Planning Section had no fixed location.  
It was forced to work from available locations and to borrow conference rooms for meetings. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
Analysis: The Planning Section did not have a fixed location within the SEOC.  Instead, 
the Section had to find temporary space and work from laptops to record planning 
information.  While the Planning Section managed to fulfill its mission, a dedicated work 
space with communication lines to other sections would be beneficial for the Planning 
Section in future activations.   
Recommendation:  
1. Identify a fixed location for the Planning Section in the SEOC. 
 
2.2.3  Logistics Section 
 
The logistics function is a coordinated effort between HSEMD staff and the state agencies 
involved in transporting and temporarily storing resources necessary for response and recovery 
missions.  This function also interfaces with federal agencies and non-governmental entities as 
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needed.15  In previous activations, the SEOC has embedded the logistics function within the 
Operations Section instead of activating a separate Logistics Section.16
 
The 2008 Summer Storms resulted in a demand for resources from localities that had exhausted 
their flood mitigation materials and recovery items.  The SEOC activated a separate Logistics 
Section for the first time to track the growing amounts of deployed or requested resources.  The 
Section was located on the first floor cafeteria of the SEOC, separate from the Operations 
Section, which was located in the basement (for details on challenges caused by this separation 
see Section 2.5.1, SEOC Internal Information Sharing and Communications).  The information 
technology (IT) staff quickly set up computer work stations with WebEOC capability that 
enabled Logistics Section personnel to focus on managing resources.  By dedicating an expanded 
staff to logistical issues, the Section successfully managed the flow of resource requests and 
tracked deployed resources in the field.    
 
The Logistics Section worked closely with other state agencies and partners, particularly DOT, 
the Department of Administrative Services (DAS), SIP, and private sector trucking companies, 
to coordinate the distribution of resources around the state (for more details, see Resource 
Management, Section 2.4 and Volunteer and 
Donations Management, Section 2.8).  The 
Logistics Section created staging areas, usually 
DOT garages, to hold resources near areas likely to 
be flooded.  This pre-positioning of resources 
allowed responders to build flood defenses and to 
mitigate potential damage.  Overall, the Logistics 
Section was critical to managing the complex 
resource needs of the extended response and 
recovery mission.  The Section operated very 
effectively, especially given that it was activated 
without prior planning or training.           Figure 7 – Volunteers Load Sandbags in Iowa City
 
Observation 2.2.3.1: Area for Improvement: Logistics Section procedures should be 
formalized. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Respond to Needs Assessment and Inventory 
                                                 
15 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
E: Logistics, 28 Mar 2003, p. E-4. 
 
16 Ibid., p. E-3. 
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i. Task: Identify and inventory by type and category all resources 
available to support emergency operations, including facilities, 
equipment, personnel, and systems (Res.B1d 5.2) 
Analysis: The Logistics Section faced challenges in communication, planning, and 
physical space.  This was the first incident that required the activation of a separate 
Logistics Section.  Consequently, SOPs were not in place to guide the Logistics staff.  
Logistics Section personnel encountered challenges communicating and coordinating 
with the other SEOC Sections.  Further, the Logistics staff members had difficulty in 
tracking the diverse types of resources required for response operations.  The Logistics 
Section coordinator started tracking pumps in an Excel spreadsheet at the beginning of 
operations and developed additional spreadsheets as the types of resources expanded.  
The Logistics Section’s functionality and efficiency in future activations can be improved 
by institutionalizing communications processes between Sections and by developing 
templates for resource tracking (for detail on information sharing processes, see Section 
2.5.1, SEOC Internal Information Sharing and Communications).     
Recommendations:  
1. Develop Logistics Section SOPs. 
2. Develop a Logistics Section Operations Handbook and templates for resource 
tracking and reporting. 
 
Observation 2.2.3.2: Strength: The Logistics Section allocated responsibilities to personnel 
by assigning responsibility for particular commodities to individuals and by designating a 
“spotter” responsible for monitoring WebEOC. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics  
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Activate Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
i. Task: Implement a resource-tracking system (Res.B1d 4.3) 
Analysis: The Logistics Section developed a commodities-based organizational system 
to facilitate its operations.  This included developing an Excel data sheet that tracked all 
resources by commodity type, amount, and current location.  Logistics Section personnel 
were assigned to manage specific commodities, such as sandbags, water pumps, 
drinkable water, and electrical generators.  One staff person was designated the “spotter” 
and dedicated to monitoring the WebEOC task log for outstanding mission requests 
assigned to the Logistics Section.  This division of responsibilities and method of 
tracking resources by commodities proved highly successful.  
Recommendation:  
1. Formalize allocation of responsibilities in Logistics Section SOPs. 
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Observation 2.2.3.3: Strength: Co-locating FEMA Logistics personnel with the SEOC 
Logistics Section facilitated communication and helped to clarify resource requests and location 
of resources. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Transport, Track, and Manage Resource 
i. Task: Request federal critical resources (Res.B1d 7.6) 
Analysis: The co-location of FEMA’s Logistics Section and the SEOC Logistics 
Section allowed for direct interaction and facilitated the transfer and coordination of 
assets from the federal government to state agencies.  On several occasions, the Logistics 
Section coordinator required immediate updates on the types of resources FEMA ordered 
and their location in transit.  The Logistics Section coordinator obtained this information 
from direct contact with the FEMA Section.  At other times, the FEMA Section turned 
over assets directly to the Logistics Section after notifying the coordinator in person.  Co-
locating the Logistics Sections in close proximity facilitated communication and 
information gathering.  Considering the SEOC Logistic Section’s lack of communication 
lines, the face-to-face interaction between logistical staff proved efficient and 
appropriate.        
Recommendation:  
1. Build this operating structure into the Logistics Section SOP or allow provisions 
in the SOP for co-locating Logistics staff in future events. 
 
2.2.4  Executive Office Support Staff 
 
The Executive Office (Governor, Lt. Governor, and HSEMD Administrator) is supported by 
Executive Office Support Staff.  The staff produces staffing plans, conducts update briefings, and 
performs administrative duties for the Executive Office.  The Executive Office Support Staff is 
located in a separate room adjacent to the main SEOC area.  HSEMD redesigned the room after 
the 2007 winter storms to include additional monitors, projectors, and work stations to support 
Executive Office members and Support Staff.  The SEOC filled the Executive Office Support 
Staff positions based upon the lessons learned from the 2007 winter storms.  
 
Observation 2.2.4.1: Strength: The Executive Office Support Staff proved an effective 
means to support the needs of the Executive Office.  However, Support Staff position 
descriptions, job responsibilities, and procedures require formalization. 
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References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
Analysis: During the Summer Storms, the Governor’s Office representation at the 
SEOC consisted of the Lieutenant Governor and her senior advisor, the Governor’s 
Office press secretary, and the Governor’s public information officer (PIO).  HSEMD 
personnel filled three positions in the Executive Office Support Staff.  Two staff 
members supported the Governor’s Office and prepared briefings.  The third developed 
SEOC staffing plans and shift schedules.  Shift schedules were posted in an Excel 
spreadsheet near the Pit Table 2 to 3 hours ahead of when the shifts would start.  SEOC 
personnel noted this was an improvement from previous incidents.   
 
The Executive Office Support Staff successfully fulfilled its mission during the Summer 
Storms.  However, the scope of Support Staff responsibilities, procedures, and guidance 
remain largely informal.  There are no formal job aids or protocols that provide 
guidelines for staffing the support needs of the Executive Office. 
Recommendation:  
1. Develop position descriptions, job aids, and protocols to serve as guidelines for 
the Executive Office Support Staff. 
 
Observation 2.2.4.2: Area for Improvement: Procedures for supporting the information 
needs of the Executive Office require further development and formalization. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Identify and Address Issues 
i. Task: Identify and elevate needs/issues up the chain of command 
as needed while tracking status (Res.B1c 6.1.5) 
Analysis: The Executive Office Support Staff relied upon Situation Reports (SITREP), 
WebEOC postings, and input from SEOC personnel to develop briefings for the 
Executive Office.  This information gathering process proved time-consuming but not 
comprehensive.  Executive Office Support Staff observed that the Joint Information 
Center (JIC) often had more accurate or timely information than the SITREPs or 
WebEOC (see SEOC Internal Information Sharing and Communications, Section 2.5.1).  
Both the Executive Office Support Staff and the PIOs staffing the JIC briefed the 
Executive Office, which was a duplicative effort that limited the efficiency of both 
entities.   
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Initially, the Executive Office Support Staff developed PowerPoint briefings for the 
Executive Office.  The Executive Office Support Staff eventually shifted to using an 
Excel spreadsheet template to meet increasing requests for greater detail.  The Support 
Staff had difficulty preparing these briefs because the Executive Office did not establish 
critical information requirements at the start of the Summer Storms. 
 
The briefings were originally scheduled to take place at 11:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. each 
day.  As the incident progressed, the briefings fell off schedule to accommodate 
unanticipated information requests from the Executive Office.  The briefings pulled 
Operations Section officers away from their posts and prevented SEOC staff members 
from planning ahead for the meetings. 
 
It should be noted that formalized processes may lack the fluidity needed to keep the 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor informed and aware of the most current information.  
Staff members’ time may be driven by information requirements rather than focused on 
recognizing what information is new and critical for the Executive Office.  Staff members 
may not anticipate what the Governor or Lieutenant Governor may want or need to know.  
Ultimately, Executive Office Support Staff processes need to be able to capture critical 
information in a timely update for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor regardless of 
their locations.  This may require that the Executive Office Support Staff maintain an 
abbreviated briefing that can be updated on short notice (for more on information sharing 
to support the Executive Office, see Section 2.5.1, SEOC Internal Information Sharing 
and Communications).       
Recommendations:  
1. Coordinate with the Executive Office to identify critical information requirements 
and to develop briefing templates. 
2. Coordinate with the Executive Office to establish and maintain a set schedule for 
briefings during activations. 
3. Assign specific agencies/functional areas/personnel the responsibility of reporting 
specific critical information requirements to Executive Office Support Staff and to 
the Chief of Operations. 
4. Designate someone to coordinate all of the requirements for briefings. 
 
2.2.5  Protocols 
 
The HSEMD Administrator, Chief of Staff, or Readiness and Response Bureau Chief are 
authorized to activate the SEOC.  This decision is based upon information that a duty officer has 
received from a county coordinator or upon the current Readiness Level.  In addition, state 
agencies may request that the SEOC be activated based upon their need for coordination.  
HSEMD defines five levels of SEOC readiness (see Section 1.2, The State Emergency 
Operations Center).  The Readiness and Response Bureau is responsible for SEOC readiness and 
initial staffing.  Specific activation procedures are outlined in the SEOC SOP.  The HSEMD 
Administrator or Readiness and Response Bureau Chief informs the Governor’s Office of SEOC 
activation.  The Governor’s Office has three points of contact who receive this information either 
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by phone or email.  This redundant communication system ensures the Governor is notified of a 
SEOC activation.  
 
Observation 2.2.5.1: Area for Improvement: SEOC activation protocols require greater 
formalization and redundancy to ensure better situational awareness among state agencies.    
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
b. Activity: Activate EOC/MACC/IOF 
i. Task: Activate, alert, and request response from EOC/MACC/IOF 
personnel (Res.B1c 4.3) 
Analysis: The SEOC lacks a formal process for determining which agencies should be 
represented upon activation.  According to the Readiness and Response Bureau Chief, the 
duty officer begins by contacting eight agencies: HSEMD, the National Guard, and the 
Departments of Corrections, Human Services, Natural Resources, Public Health, Public 
Safety, and Transportation.  After the initial eight agencies are contacted, other agency 
representatives receive a notice of SEOC activation when their agency’s assistance is 
required for the incident response and recovery.  When the tornado struck Parkersburg on 
May 25, the SEOC duty officer did not receive a call from a county coordinator.  Instead, 
a DPS dispatch informed the duty officer of the tornado.  The duty officer then called 
HSEMD Readiness and Response Bureau personnel to determine which agency 
representatives needed to report to the SEOC.   
Recommendations:  
1. Further develop and refine activation protocols.      
2. Establish redundant communication methods for notifying agencies of activations. 
 
Observation 2.2.5.2: Area for Improvement: The Operations Section did not conduct a 
debriefing for SEOC staff members when response operations concluded.   
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Demobilize Emergency Operations Center Management 
i. Task: Facilitate demobilization plans and procedures for 
preparation of after-action reports (Res.B1c 9.3) 
b. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop SOPs for activation, operation, and deactivation of 
EOC (Res.B1c 1.1.1) 
Analysis: The SEOC deactivated without conducting a debriefing.  A scheduled 
debriefing ensures that valuable information for improving operations is identified and 
retained.  A debriefing also provides a channel for staff members to voice concerns.   
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Recommendation:  
1. Establish a protocol for conducting a debriefing before SEOC deactivation and/or 
transition to recovery operations. 
 
2.2.6  Staffing 
 
The Iowa Emergency Response Plan delineates the roles of staff members within functions.  The 
research, analysis, and planning liaison ensures that there are adequate staffing levels for all 
functions.17  During the 2008 Summer Storms, the Executive Office Support Staff dedicated one 
staff member to creating and posting SEOC shift assignments.  While SEOC managers utilized 
staff effectively, the incident offers lessons about staffing assignments and ensuring that staff 
members receive the necessary support during large-scale incidents of extended duration.   
 
Observation 2.2.6.1: Area for Improvement: The scope and duration of the incident 
strained SEOC staffing resources. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management  
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operation 
i. Task: Ensure appropriate maintenance and rest cycles are included 
in resource (personnel and equipment) management activities 
(Res.B1c 3.1.3) 
Analysis: The magnitude and intensity of the Summer Storms disrupted normal SEOC 
shift lengths and transitions.  The incidents struck in quick succession, which required 
staff members to work longer shifts than normal.  Staff members often worked more than 
12 hours during a shift.  The SEOC should consider reviewing techniques and processes 
for managing shifts, particularly during prolonged activations.  This review should 
include techniques for managing shift lengths, methods for ensuring coordination 
between shifts, and preventing fatigue or burnout during activations.  Further, the SEOC 
needs to consider options for expanding its staffing pool for large-scale or prolonged 
activations through tapping into state agency staffs or through the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).  These options have various strengths and 
weaknesses.  State agency personnel may be unfamiliar with SEOC procedures and may 
require training before they can contribute to SEOC activities.  Similarly, the SEOC 
could access trained personnel through EMAC, although this option would only be 
valuable during prolonged activations.          
Recommendations:  
1. Identify options for expanding the SEOC staffing pool in the event of large-scale 
or prolonged activations. 
2. Conduct a review of shift management techniques and processes. 
                                                 
 
17 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
B: Research, Analysis, & Planning,  28 Mar 2003, p. B-4. 
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3. Build a cadre of SEOC-trained personnel in other state agencies. 
4. Consider using Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel, EMAC resources, 
or county coordinators to augment SEOC staffing. 
 
Observation 2.2.6.2: Area for Improvement: Assigning two or more critical functions to a 
single SEOC staff person may create conflicting priorities during large-scale incidents. 
References:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish and implement an order of command succession or 
continuity consistent with the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) (Res.B1c 1.1.4) 
2. Target Capabilities List, Planning 
a. Develop/Revise Operational Plans 
i. Task: Develop emergency operations/response plans that describe 
how personnel, equipment, and other government, non-
governmental, and private resources will support and sustain 
incident management requirements (ComA 2.4) 
Analysis: Many HSEMD personnel hold multiple SEOC roles and responsibilities.  
These personnel successfully fulfilled each of their dual roles without difficulty during 
previous activations.  However, the 2008 Summer Storms demonstrated potential 
problems associated with “dual-hatting” critical functions.  Two examples illustrate this 
issue.  First, the HSEMD Operations Chief led the Operations Section and assumed the 
role of volunteer and donations manager during standard SEOC operations.  The 
Operations Chief focused on her operations role and was able to dedicate minimal time to 
her volunteer and donations management responsibilities.  As a result, these 
responsibilities were turned over to the executive director of SIP.  The SIP executive 
director facilitated donations for both private and non-profit resources (see Volunteer and 
Donations Management, Section 2.8, for more information).  Second, the HSEMD Chief 
training officer had been integral in the development the Planning Section framework 
before the Summer Storms.  However, he deployed as a field liaison during the first 10 
days of the incident period.  Consequently, the SEOC did not activate the Planning 
Section until after the Chief Training Officer returned from the field.  This deprived the 
SEOC of valuable planning during the initial stages of the Summer Storms.  
Recommendations:  
1. Develop contingency plans for delegating critical functions to a secondary SEOC 
staff member during large-scale incidents. 
2. Cross-train HSEMD staff members in multiple functional areas/sections to allow 
for absence, illness, fatigue, schedule rotation, etc. 
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Observation 2.2.6.3: Area for Improvement: SEOC staffing processes were complicated 
by a lack of awareness of personnel skill sets. 
References:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operations 
i. Task: Establish organization/operation of EOC/MACC/IOF 
(Res.B1c.3.1) 
2. Target Capabilities List, Planning 
a. Activity: Develop/Revise Operational Plans 
i. Task: Develop emergency operations/response plans that describe 
how personnel, equipment, and other government, non-
governmental, and private resources will support and sustain 
incident management requirements (ComA 2.4) 
Analysis: The Executive Office Support Staff effectively organized and published the 
shift schedule within the SEOC.  However, Section Chiefs did not always have input into 
the staffing for their Sections, which proved problematic at times.  Personnel were 
assigned to positions without having the proper skills to function effectively.  At other 
times, the Operations Section was either under-staffed or staffed with representatives 
unfamiliar with SEOC procedures.  In some cases, National Guard personnel assigned to 
the Pit Table were pulled away to do other missions, leaving gaps in coverage.  
Recommendation:  
1. Compile information on SEOC staff skill sets, and incorporate skills 
considerations into the staffing process. 
 
Observation 2.2.6.4: Area for Improvement: The SEOC should make crisis counseling 
available for staff members during high-intensity, extended duration activations. 
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operation 
i. Task: Ensure appropriate maintenance and rest cycles are included 
in resource (personnel and equipment) management activities 
(Res.B1c 3.1.3) 
Analysis: The SEOC has existing relationships with crisis counselors and utilized them 
in the past, such as during the 1993 floods.  The intensity and length of the 2008 Summer 
Storms created a high-stress environment for the SEOC staff.  However, crisis counseling 
was not made available to staff members.  Crisis counseling could have helped SEOC 
staff members cope with the stress of prolonged operations or emotional incidents such as 
the tornado at the Little Sioux Boy Scout Camp. 
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Recommendation:  
1. Ensure crisis counseling is made available for SEOC personnel who desire such 
services during high-intensity, extended duration activations. 
 
2.2.7  Systems 
 
IT systems provide the essential information and processes that are necessary to manage 
incidents effectively.  Two IT systems provided critical tools to the SEOC during the 2008 
Summer Storms: WebEOC and geographic information systems (GIS).  The SEOC has a 
dedicated IT staff to support the use of these systems during incidents. 
 
2.2.7.1  Information Technology Support 
 
The HSEMD IT staff provides IT support to the SEOC.  During the 2008 Summer Storms, four 
HSEMD IT personnel staffed the SEOC.  Each IT support staff member was assigned to provide 
general IT support, to act as a GIS analyst, or to provide support for WebEOC.   
 
Observation 2.2.7.1.1: Area for Improvement: The increased demand for IT and systems 
support strained the SEOC’s IT support staff. 
References:  
1. Target Capability: Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operation 
i. Task: Ensure appropriate maintenance and rest cycles are included 
in resource (personnel and equipment) management activities 
(Res.B1c 3.1.3) 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Coordinate and provide telecommunications and information 
technology support to federal, regional, state, tribal, and local 
officials and the private sector(s) (ComC 5.3.1.2) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Planning 
a. Activity: Develop/Revise Operational Plans 
i. Task: Develop emergency operations/response plans that describe 
how personnel, equipment, and other government, non-
governmental, and private resources will support and sustain 
incident management requirements (ComA 2.4) 
Analysis: The 2008 Summer Storms required a greater use of and reliance on IT 
systems due to both the scope of the incident and the demands of the expanded SEOC 
staff.  The SEOC’s technology needs overwhelmed the IT staff.  The IT staff had to equip 
rooms for FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers while also assisting approximately 
200 SEOC personnel with WebEOC and other applications.  IT support personnel had to 
balance their official support assignments with other tasks such as WebEOC, GIS, and 
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technical support responsibilities.  GIS analysts were often asked to provide technical 
support for WebEOC or to assist with technology tools in the Executive Office in 
addition to their mapping and modeling duties.  Consequently, staff members were 
frequently pulled away from their primary assigned responsibilities.  
 
SEOC IT staff obtained additional GIS capabilities from the Department of Public 
Defense and through pre-existing partnerships with other agencies, such as the DNR.  
The SEOC should explore additional opportunities to enhance its IT capabilities for 
future operations through additional collaboration with DAS Information Technology 
Enterprise (ITE) staff.  In large-scale or prolonged activations, response partners may 
need to utilize their own IT staff members to augment and support the HSEMD IT staff in 
the EOC. 
Recommendation:  
1. Develop an IT support surge capacity for large-scale or extended duration 
incidents. 
2. Engage the DAS ITE to secure its assistance during prolonged SEOC activations.   
 
2.2.7.2  WebEOC 
 
WebEOC is the Internet-based information management system used by the state of Iowa to 
communicate and coordinate both internally and with other command centers.  WebEOC is a 
customizable tool that can be configured by the SEOC to make specific modules or sections 
active or inactive.  The system allows real-time data to be shared through various information 
logs, such as an Event Log and a Missions/Tasks manager.  The state of Iowa utilizes WebEOC 
to coordinate mission and task assignments and to manage overall operations.  The tool also 
serves as the primary repository for SITREPs, press releases, and other documents.  State and 
county officials can access WebEOC to facilitate information management and to maintain 
situational awareness.  
 
Iowa emergency managers statewide relied heavily on WebEOC during the 2008 Summer 
Storms.  HSEMD personnel first logged onto the system shortly after the Enhanced Fujita (EF)-5 
tornado passed through Parkersburg on May 25.  The SEOC and county EOCs posted 
information to the system to create a real-time chronology of events and activities throughout the 
Summer Storms.  This information included situational awareness such as property and road 
damage, county EOC activations, shelter operations, and resource requests (for more on 
WebEOC and information sharing, see Section 2.5.1, SEOC Internal Information Sharing and 
Communications).   
 
Observation 2.2.7.2.1: Strength: WebEOC served as the primary means of information 
sharing within the SEOC, including playing a critical role in assigning and tracking missions, 
tasks, and resources.    
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan  
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2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish operational and redundant communications 
systems for EOC operation (Res.B1c 1.3)  
3. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Maintain a common operating picture (COP) for real time 
sharing of information with all the participating entities to ensure 
all responder agencies are working from the same information 
(ComC 5.5) 
Analysis: WebEOC served as the primary tool for maintaining situational awareness for 
the state of Iowa.  The system acted as the central means for information gathering for the 
state.  WebEOC played a critical role in assigning and tracking missions and tasks 
throughout the state during the rapidly expanding incident.  It became particularly 
valuable following the decision to locate the Logistics Section a floor above the 
Operations Section.  When a resource request was called in to the Operations Section, the 
staff member answering the call would assign the request to the Logistics Section through 
the WebEOC Missions/Tasks manager.  The Logistics Section coordinator created a staff 
position dedicated to monitoring WebEOC for these resource request assignments.  
WebEOC was also used to assign missions and tasks to response partners.  In some cases, 
the failure to provide updates to missions and tasks assigned to partners on WebEOC 
forced the Operations Section to follow up with the assigned agency for information (for 
more on information sharing, see Section 2.5.1, SEOC Internal Information Sharing and 
Communications).  
Recommendations:  
1. Maintain current use of WebEOC.  
2. Develop SOPs for the use of WebEOC.  These should be integrated with other 
SEOC information sharing SOPs and protocols. 
 
Observation 2.2.7.2.2: Area for Improvement: While exceptionally useful during the 
Summer Storms, WebEOC’s current configuration lacks functions necessary to best meet users’ 
needs. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish operational and redundant communications 
systems for EOC operation (Res.B1c 1.3) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
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i. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
Analysis: Some WebEOC users expressed frustration with various aspects of the 
system’s functionality during the 2008 Summer Storms.  For example, there was no way 
to link tasks to missions, which affected SEOC and other response agencies.  This was a 
common complaint from both state- and county-level users.  Some county EOC 
personnel felt that there was too much information on the system, which cluttered the 
system’s pages.  Several county and local EOC users noted that they were unable to 
assign one person to the duty of monitoring WebEOC.  They felt they had to wade 
through excessive amounts of information before they could get to the entries that 
concerned them.  Conversely, other users liked having visibility into operations in other 
counties.  Based upon this feedback, there is a clear need to adjust the configuration of 
WebEOC to better meet users’ requirements.  Finally, further customization is needed to 
create new WebEOC message boards to separate some information but still allow access 
to county users.  For example, DOT Road Closure information could be removed from 
the Event Log and entered into a separate DOT Road Closure board.   
Recommendation:  
1. Gather requirements from all stakeholders and reconfigure WebEOC in 
accordance with enhancement requests.     
 
Observation 2.2.7.2.3: Area for Improvement: State and local officials would benefit from 
additional training to guide their use of WebEOC during incidents. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Task: Conduct EOC/MACC/IOF specific training (Res.B1c 2.1) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Task: Develop and implement awareness training program for 
response communications (ComC 2.1.1) 
Analysis: There was a high degree of variance in users’ familiarity with WebEOC, both 
within the SEOC and throughout the state.  Some personnel were highly proficient with 
the system, while others did not know how to log in to WebEOC.  While state, county, 
and local personnel had participated in WebEOC training, many required tutorials before 
they could use the system during the Summer Storms.  Many learned the system quickly 
on the job.  However, providing on-the-spot training had several negative consequences 
for SEOC operations.  First, the training distracted those serving as instructors from their 
immediate responsibilities.  Second, the need for WebEOC training meant that some 
personnel were not able to immediately contribute to SEOC operations.   
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Recommendations:  
1. Provide training for WebEOC use in incidents and exercises. 
2. Establish an ongoing training schedule for state and county users.  
3. Consider staffing a position dedicated to “on-the-spot” training of WebEOC 
during SEOC activations for new users as well as a quick refresher for existing 
users. 
4. Emphasize the filtering function during agency training, and standardize input 
fields to further support the filtering function. 
5. Provide further training to SEOC staff members on the resource management 
tools already available in WebEOC. 
6. Consider requiring WebEOC training as part of the course requirements for all 
county coordinators. 
7. Develop an online WebEOC training course. 
 
Observation 2.2.7.2.4: Area for Improvement: There was widespread confusion at the 
county level regarding how resources should be requested from the SEOC. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex C: Resource Management 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Respond to Needs Assessment and Inventory 
i. Task: Request needed resources from EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1d 
5.3) 
Analysis: Many county EOC personnel believed WebEOC was intended as a vehicle to 
submit resource requests to the SEOC.  However, SEOC Operations Section personnel 
indicated that WebEOC was never intended to function as a resource request tool.  They 
stated that the standard method of requesting resources was by phone.  The SEOC did not 
configure WebEOC to receive resource requests.  Consequently, there was no template to 
ensure that requests entered into the system contained all required information.  As a 
result, Operations and Logistics section personnel had to follow up with officials 
requesting resources to obtain additional details prior to fulfilling their requests.  Further, 
Operations officers often missed requests submitted only through the WebEOC Event 
Log because the message board turned over entries faster than they could identify them.  
Recommendations:  
1. Develop SOPs and templates for requesting resources from the SEOC. 
2. Emphasize the proper process for requesting resources during WebEOC training. 
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2.2.7.3  Geographic Information Systems 
 
The state of Iowa used GIS extensively during the 2008 Summer Storms.  HSEMD staffed the 
SEOC with two GIS specialists during the day, while one was on duty during the night shift.  
These specialists generated maps containing a vast amount of state and local GIS data by using 
federal, state, and local population, parcel, and flood datasets.  Specialists employed GIS to 
create maps and services showing disaster declarations by county, flood inundation, tornado 
paths, damaged homes, and road closures.  State GIS products were most frequently distributed 
to the Operations Section and the Executive Office.  Some maps were made available to the 
entire SEOC through WebEOC.  These were posted on the system and taken down daily so as 
not to overcrowd WebEOC with documents.  
 
Observation 2.2.7.3.1: Strength: Close coordination between the SEOC GIS analysts, the 
DNR GIS team, and local GIS staff was critical for maintaining situational awareness. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Support identification and determination of potential hazards 
and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting (Res.B1c 
8.2.2) 
Analysis: State agencies openly shared GIS data during the response and recovery 
phases.  HSEMD and DNR GIS analysts regularly shared base data, disaster-related 
information, and models.  HSEMD supplied the DNR with a flood inundation tool that 
was used by GIS specialists to predict flooding and to anticipate the impacts of river 
crests.  This allowed it to identify at-risk communities based upon FEMA Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps.  DNR also applied its models to pinpoint facilities that would be at 
risk due to flooding and contacted those facilities to determine the status of site planning 
and protection efforts.  The SEOC printed and posted maps, which kept its staff informed 
of flood predictions.  This coordination provided the SEOC with additional flood 
inundation predictions by using GIS and is a great example of coordination. 
 
Several counties regularly shared their local GIS information to aid state and federal 
response efforts.  Linn and Johnson counties made virtually all of their GIS data available 
for response and recovery efforts.  This information proved invaluable for assessing the 
current and potential events during the flooding.  It enabled the state to have a detailed 
perspective on such issues as flood extents, damaged properties, and businesses impacted 
by the flood.   
Recommendation:  
1. Continue the relationships between the SEOC GIS analysts and agency analysts. 
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Observation 2.2.7.3.2: Area for Improvement: SEOC staff would benefit from greater 
familiarity with GIS capabilities and applications. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Support identification and determination of potential hazards 
and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting (Res.B1c 
8.2.2) 
b. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Task: Conduct EOC/MACC/IOF specific training (Res.B1c 2.1) 
Analysis: While GIS played a critical role in SEOC planning and response operations, 
many SEOC staffers were unfamiliar with the tool and its primary applications.  Many 
staff members did not fully understand how GIS can enhance planning and the 
visualization of impacts during an incident.  SEOC staff members often requested basic 
maps from the GIS analysts, rather than more extensive analytical applications of GIS 
mapping.  Some SEOC agency representatives tended to rely on the SEOC GIS analysts 
instead of drawing on their own agency’s GIS capabilities.  The staff members from 
several departments, particularly DNR and DPH, relied on their agency’s GIS staff to 
assist them in accomplishing their missions. 
Recommendation:  
1. Ensure that state agency responders utilize their agency GIS resources prior to 
disasters in order to bolster their understanding of GIS capabilities. 
 
Observation 2.2.7.3.3: Area for Improvement: There is a need for statewide GIS data 
sharing. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex B: Research, Analysis, and Planning 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Support identification and determination of potential hazards 
and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting (Res.B1c 
8.2.2) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop interoperable telecommunications and IT systems 
across governmental departments and agencies (ComC 1.3.1) 
Analysis: The 2008 Summer Storms demonstrated the need for greater coordination and 
sharing of GIS data among state, county, and local governmental agencies.  While 
information could be exchanged through email and other means, there were no formal 
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channels for transferring data between the state, counties, and cities.  SEOC GIS 
specialists used established relationships with GIS personnel at other state agencies and 
counties.  However, GIS specialists had to wait for formal agreements to be signed before 
they gained access to the necessary data.  A statewide data-sharing framework could help 
redress this issue in future activations.   
Recommendations:  
1. Develop a statewide GIS data sharing framework. 
2. Coordinate with the ongoing efforts of the Iowa Geographic Information Council 
and counties. 
3. Collaborate with DAS ITE to ensure that it will provide GIS assistance to the 
SEOC during activations for disasters.  
 
2.3  Coordination with Incident Sites 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITIES: On-Site Incident Management 
 Emergency Operations Center Management 
 Volunteer Management and Donations 
 
2.3.1  Incident Management Teams 
 
Iowa Code 29C.8 allows the Governor or the HSEMD Administrator to deploy a sanctioned 
homeland security emergency response team upon a valid request from the local incident 
commander through the county emergency management coordinator.18  Most of the personnel 
and equipment comprising a sanctioned team are drawn from local emergency responders.  
 
The Iowa Incident Management Team (IA-
IMT) is one of Iowa’s sanctioned homeland 
security response teams.19   The team began 
training in 2005 and consists of qualified all-
hazards specialists who are available for rapid 
deployment to incidents.  The state formed the 
IA-IMT to provide support to local officials 
who become overwhelmed during an incident.  
The team can serve as relief for fatigued 
personnel and provide technical advice.  The 
IA-IMT possesses the qualifications and 
experience to manage an incident involving 
Figure 8 – Responders at the Parkersburg Incident 
Command 
                                                 
18 “Typically, this would first involve a local disaster declaration from one or many jurisdictions experiencing an 
emergency.”   
Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Iowa Homeland Security Response Teams, Dec 
2007, p. 4, http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Newsroom/Publications/ResponseTeams1207.pdf. 
 
19 Other response teams include Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, Weapons of Mass Destruction Special 
Weapons and Tactics Teams, Veterinary Response Teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Hazardous Materials 
Teams, and Urban Search and Rescue Teams. 
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multiple jurisdictions or large metropolitan areas.  The IA-IMT is deployed as a state resource 
team upon proper declarations and documentation; typically, this would first involve a request 
from the local incident commander for assistance.20  The state covers all eligible costs for such 
IA-IMT deployments. 
 
The 24-member IA-IMT is divided into three separate “teams,” comprised of eight members 
each.  The teams are on-call on a monthly deployment rotation schedule.  Each team can be 
deployed for up to 7 days.  Other state resources can be used to support IA-IMT deployments by 
providing equipment or logistical support.21  The 2008 Summer Storms represented the first 
activation of the entire team, as all three IA-IMT teams were deployed during the incident. 
 
Observation 2.3.1.1: Strength: The IA-IMT, working with the National Guard, played a 
critical role in establishing incident command at Parkersburg. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams 
3. NIMS, Incident Command System (ICS) 
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Implement On-Site Incident Management 
i. Task: Initiate and implement the ICS (Res.B1a 4.2) 
Analysis: During the 2008 Summer Storms, the SEOC deployed the IA-IMT to 
Parkersburg on Monday, May 26.  The IA-IMT would typically establish a point of 
contact (POC) with local incident command to establish clear lines of command in 
accordance with ICS principles.  At Parkersburg, the IA-IMT understandably 
encountered a chaotic scene that required additional efforts to establish command 
relationships.  Emergency medical services had completed operations, but all other 
response entities lacked a joint command structure.  A breakdown in communications had 
occurred between the incident commander and supporting state agencies.  The IA-IMT 
offered guidance for establishing a working ICS.    
Recommendations:  
1. Continue to emphasize the importance of the ICS structure. 
2. Support the continued use of IMTs. 
 
Observation 2.3.1.2: Strength: The IA-IMT was tasked with and successfully managed an 
influx of volunteers in Parkersburg. 
                                                 
20 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.  Iowa Homeland Security Response Teams.  Dec 
2007, p. 4, http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Newsroom/Publications/ResponseTeams1207.pdf. 
 
21Ibid. 
Section 2: Detailed Findings 43 
 
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams 
3. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Conduct Resource Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
4. Target Capabilities List, Volunteer Management and Donations 
a. Activity: Organize Volunteers and Assign Them to Disaster Relief Efforts 
i. Task: Support response operations using volunteer resources and 
volunteered technical capabilities (Res.B1e 5.6) 
Analysis: Emergency responders, emergency 
equipment, and volunteers began to arrive in 
Parkersburg immediately after the tornado to assist 
with response and recovery operations.  The 
automobiles of over 600 volunteers clogged roads 
and prevented debris-removal equipment from 
accessing critical locations.  With increasing 
numbers of volunteers expected to arrive in the 
coming days, the IA-IMT established a shuttle 
system to transport volunteers into the Parkersburg 
area to reduce the number of cars near the incident 
area.  The IA-IMT instructed volunteers to report to 
a parking lot outside the area where they gave the 
volunteers a safety briefing and distributed safety 
equipment.  Volunteers were then shuttled to a registration site before being sent to various 
locations.  The registration process also ensured that incident command knew the exact location 
of the volunteers.  These processes enabled the IA-IMT to plan for the next operational period 
and, thus, to manage successfully the arrival of 1,300 volunteers the next day (for more on 
volunteers, see Section 2.8, Volunteer and Donations Management).  
Figure 9 – Transporting Volunteers to 
Parkersburg 
Recommendation:  
1. Establish an SOP for volunteer operations that addresses establishing check-in 
areas, volunteer training, use of safety gear, operational forecasts, mediation of 
mission interruptions, and other issues. 
 
Observation 2.3.1.3: Area for Improvement: County officials had insufficient 
understanding of the purpose and capabilities of IMTs, which hampered initial integration. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams  
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3. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Conduct Resource Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
b. Activity: Establish Full On-Site Incident Command 
i. Task: Coordinate operations with specialized emergency response 
teams (e.g. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)/tactical, bomb 
squad/explosives, hazardous materials (HAZMAT), Land-Based 
Search and Rescue) (Res.B1a 4.2.2) 
Analysis: Based upon the extent of the flood threat at Oakville, the IA-IMT was 
deployed to the area prior to an official request from the county coordinator.  The IA-
IMT encountered skepticism from the Louisa County coordinator and responders when it 
arrived in Oakville.  County officials quickly came to recognize the value of the IMT.  
The IMT provided support for the incident commander and developed an email account 
to streamline communications with other partners.  The IA-IMT deployed to Des Moines 
on Sunday, June 8, before flooding occurred based upon flood predictions from the Army 
Corps of Engineers.  The IA-IMT worked with Polk County Emergency Management, 
Polk County Health, local response agencies, and private entities to develop an 
evacuation plan based upon the Polk County emergency response plan and the Des 
Moines metropolitan emergency planner’s downtown evacuation plan.  The plan focused 
on special needs residents located in areas that would be hit the hardest if the levees 
breached.  However, the City of Des Moines developed its own evacuation and response 
plan.  While the two plans were similar, drafting separate plans wasted valuable time that 
could have been devoted to other tasks.  This confused local businesses and those entities 
that had established prior arrangements for medical care, transportation, and sheltering.   
Recommendations:  
1. Conduct further outreach to counties on the IA-IMT. 
2. Develop IMT activation criteria and triggers. 
3. Develop SOPs for informing counties and localities about the state’s intent to 
activate the IMT in their areas.  
4. Educate elected officials about the value of participating in a county EOC or a 
JIC. 
5. Educate elected officials about the value of using existing plans that have been 
coordinated and exercised with other agencies and organizations as well as the use 
of Incident Action Plans (IAP) to manage incidents and events. 
 
Observation 2.3.1.4: Strength: IA-IMT members successfully coordinated with an out-of-
state IMT to support response efforts in Louisa County. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Code 29C.21 
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3. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams  
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Conduct Resource Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
b. Activity: Establish Full On-Site Incident Command 
i. Task: Coordinate operations with specialized emergency response 
teams (e.g. SWAT/tactical, bomb squad/explosives, HAZMAT, 
Land-Based Search and Rescue) (Res.B1a 4.2.2) 
Analysis: The SEOC deployed the IA-IMT to Oakville in advance of the extensive 
flooding moving toward the area.  However, because the IA-IMT was already occupied 
in Cedar Rapids, the SEOC utilized EMAC to request assistance from a Minnesota IMT 
(MN-IMT).  Two IA-IMT members traveled to Oakville and coordinated with the MN-
IMT to assist county coordinators with defining the mission and establishing a command 
structure.     
Recommendation:  
1. Continue relationship with EMAC and continue to embed IA-IMT members into 
IMTs accessed through EMAC for maximum situation awareness and response 
coordination. 
 
Observation 2.3.1.5: Strength: The IA-IMT provided critical support to county and local 
incident commands and EOCs. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams 
3. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Conduct Resource Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
Analysis: The IA-IMT proved exceptionally valuable during the Summer Storms and 
provided concrete benefits to county and local officials in Parkersburg, Oakville, and Des 
Moines.  The IA-IMT facilitated the establishment of incident command and supplied 
critical support in expanding local operations to meet a large-scale, long-term incident.  
The team also facilitated essential communications links between local jurisdictions and 
the SEOC.   
Recommendations:  
1. Provide ongoing educational awareness to county coordinators regarding the 
teams’ capabilities and activation protocols.   
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2. Ensure early coordination occurs with impacted areas, and discuss potential need 
for IMT deployment. 
 
2.3.2  Field Liaisons 
 
The SEOC developed and implemented the field liaison concept prior to the 2008 Summer 
Storms.  However, the concept had not been widely or systematically employed in previous 
incidents.  Rather, the SEOC assigned field liaisons based upon the individual’s physical location 
during the onset of the incident and/or their familiarity with the affected region.  During the 2008 
Summer Storms, many county emergency management coordinators were fully engaged in 
response operations.  This made it difficult to maintain a COP between the SEOC and the 
county.  Consequently, the SEOC used field liaisons to provide a critical bridge between it and 
the incident areas.  On May 26, the SEOC deployed two field liaisons to Parkersburg to serve as 
its “eyes and ears” at the scene.  The SEOC deployed additional field liaisons to Black Hawk and 
Benton counties soon after flooding began in these areas.  Most field liaisons spent several days 
at an incident site before backup liaisons relieved them. 
 
Observation 2.3.2.1: Strength: Field liaisons proved an invaluable resource for the SEOC 
and the National Guard to gather first-hand information from the affected areas and to help frame 
missions. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams  
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1c 
5.2.2) 
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Direct On-Site Incident Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
Analysis: Field liaisons provided an essential communications link between the SEOC 
and county EOCs, local emergency management, and incident command.  They also 
provided additional input for situational awareness at the SEOC.  Field liaisons ensured 
the SEOC received evacuation information, which allowed it to anticipate sheltering and 
resource requests more effectively.  Field liaisons also successfully communicated 
information from the SEOC to localities.  This information enabled local officials to 
understand more clearly the state resources that could be made available to them.  This 
information helped to minimize the time between identifying the need for state resources 
and their delivery.  One field liaison provided WebEOC access for a jurisdiction, which 
allowed it to gain a clearer picture of the situation in the rest of the state.  
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Recommendation:  
1. Maintain the use of field liaisons during major incidents. 
 
Observation 2.3.2.2: Area for Improvement: The field liaison concept needs to be further 
developed and formalized. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams  
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1c 
5.2.2) 
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Direct On-Site Incident Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
Analysis: SEOC staff members who deployed as field liaisons during the 2008 Summer 
Storms lacked a clearly defined mission and formal SOPs to guide their efforts.  The 
SEOC has established neither guidelines on qualifications to serve as a field liaison nor 
clear protocols on field liaison activation, operations, or deactivation.  There was little 
coordination, guidance, or direction between the field liaison teams sent by the National 
Guard and those sent by HSEMD.  Further, there is no indication that HSEMD field 
liaisons coordinated in a formal and integrated manner with field personnel from other 
state agencies during their deployments.    
Recommendations:  
1. Develop SOPs and clear mission guidance for SEOC field liaisons, including 
critical information requirements, roles, responsibilities, limitations, and 
restrictions to assistance. 
2. Identify and train HSEMD staff members to serve as field liaisons. 
3. Conduct an exercise to validate the field liaison SOPs and training. 
4. Coordinate the development of the field liaison concept with the National Guard’s 
efforts to develop community liaison teams as well as other relevant state 
agencies. 
5. Explore opportunities to develop a common SOP and training for all state agency 
field liaisons to ensure optimal effectiveness of state assistance to impacted areas. 
 
Observation 2.3.2.3: Area for Improvement: HSEMD needs to ensure that county 
emergency management coordinators have a clear understanding of the field liaisons’ purpose 
and capabilities. 
 
Section 2: Detailed Findings 48 
 
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.8 
2. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination, 
Attachment 1: State Forward Operations Teams  
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1c 
5.2.2) 
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Direct On-Site Incident Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
Analysis: Some county emergency management coordinators initially perceived the 
field liaisons as an indication that the state doubted their response capabilities rather than 
as an asset to augment their coordination with the SEOC.  This initial resistance delayed 
the integration of field liaisons into some county EOCs.  These concerns faded once the 
field liaisons demonstrated their capacity to assist county operations.  Further outreach to 
counties is needed to clarify the purpose and capabilities of SEOC field liaisons.  This 
will help ensure that field liaisons are effectively integrated with county response 
operations. 
Recommendation:  
1. Conduct outreach to county emergency management coordinators to ensure that 
they understand field liaison purpose and capabilities. 
 
Observation 2.3.2.4: Strength: Embedded National Guard community liaison teams 
provided coordination and established relationships with county officials more than short-
deployment Rapid Needs Assessment Teams (RNAT). 
Reference:  
1. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Direct On-Site Incident Management 
i. Task: Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, 
state, and federal first responders (Res.B1a 4.2.3) 
Analysis: The National Guard repeatedly received mission requests from county and 
local officials early in the Summer Storms that failed to describe the mission parameters 
and justifications adequately.  The National Guard deployed RNATs to several 
communities to help define these missions.  RNATs typically function as short-
deployment teams, staying in a particular community just long enough to make an initial 
assessment before moving on.  Thus, the RNAT model allowed no time for communities 
to build relationships with the teams.  To better address this issue, the National Guard and 
HSEMD developed community liaison teams designed to work in a local EOC or 
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incident command for longer periods of time.  Generally, these teams developed better 
relationships with the communities than the RNATs.  
 
The Polk County EOC collaborated with its National Guard liaisons to develop a process 
for submitting mission requests through both civilian and military channels.  Under this 
process, the EOC submitted requests to the SEOC through WebEOC and then followed 
up with a phone call to the SEOC.  Meanwhile, the National Guard liaisons provided a 
“heads-up” through their own command structure at the SEOC.  Informing both the 
SEOC and the National Guard of the request greatly expedited the process and decreased 
the time needed to fulfill a request for National Guard support.  For example, the Polk 
County EOC requested 40 people for sandbagging duty at a levee; the requested 
personnel arrived within 1 hour of the request.  While this process may have worked well 
for this event, it should not be viewed as normal operations.  During this event, over 
4,000 National Guard troops were placed on State Active Duty, making them more 
readily available.   
Recommendation:  
1. Assign an Iowa National Guard liaison to operate from the Pit Table. 
 
2.4  Resource Management 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITIES: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
 Emergency Operations Center Management 
 
 
The SEOC’s resource management function is responsible for the acquisition and allocation of 
resources to protect human life and critical infrastructure.  During the 2008 Summer Storms, the 
SEOC leadership faced challenges in acquiring, 
distributing, storing, and tracking resources for four 
weeks.  Resource management required close 
coordination between the Logistics Section and 
SEOC purchasing agents.  Resource management 
staff members had to supplement state assets that 
were becoming stretched thin due to the continuous 
and simultaneous response operations.  Flood 
mitigation materials such as sandbags, water 
pumps, and poly-plastics were in especially high-
demand and required strategic placement during the 
floods.  
Figure 10 – A Flood Supplies Distribution 
Site in Mason City 
 
While there were some complications with resource management, the SEOC staff did an 
exemplary job, considering the amount of resources required by the span and duration of the 
floods.  HSEMD has indicated that it plans to work with state agencies to determine logical pre-
staging areas throughout the state and will further develop processes for resource tracking. 
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Observation 2.4.1: Strength: DAS personnel integrated themselves into the SEOC smoothly 
and had a presence in both the Operations Section and the Logistics Section to maintain 
awareness of statewide operations.  
References:   
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex C: Resource Management 
2. National Incident Management System, Logistics Section 
3. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Activate Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
i. Task: Meet ongoing resource needs through appropriate 
procurement sources from the EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1d 3.2.4) 
4. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
Analysis: DAS handled state resource acquisition effectively, even though it does not 
normally staff the SEOC resource management function.  During the first week of June, 
the HSEMD Administrator requested DAS assistance at the SEOC.  DAS agents 
researched resources needed for response operations and took steps to procure them upon 
approval from HSEMD.  DAS purchasing agents obtained materials to combat the floods, 
including items such as Hesco Barriers, pumps, and sandbags.  DAS also staffed 
permanent positions in the Operations Section and the Logistics Section to maintain 
situational awareness across Sections.  
Recommendations:  
1. Continue this practice in future SEOC activations. 
2. Consider implementing provisions into the Logistics Section SOPs for the co-
location of the state purchasing agent. 
 
Observation 2.4.2: Strength: The use of DOT facilities proved highly effective for resource 
staging. 
References:   
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics 
2. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Activate Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
i. Task: Implement plans and procedures for establishing a logistics 
staging area for internal and external response personnel, 
equipment, and supplies (Res.B1d 4.2) 
b. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for resource 
management in accordance with NIMS, and include pre-
positioning of resources to efficiently and effectively respond to an 
event (Res.B1d 1) 
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3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
Analysis: The SEOC could not stage critical materials at a central location due to the 
heavy flooding and obstruction of many interstate routes.  Instead, the SEOC decided to 
use staging areas to pre-position materials in areas likely to be affected by floods.  This 
effort required coordination among the Planning Section, Logistics Section, the DOT, the 
DPS, the National Guard, and the SIP.  Initially, SEOC personnel had difficulty 
establishing staging areas, because state agencies lacked facilities to store a large amount 
of material.  DOT offered its garages to serve as staging areas.  Some sites lacked 
equipment such as forklifts, but DOT personnel worked to overcome such issues.  In one 
case, personnel used chains to physically remove heavy sandbags from the distribution 
site.  Overall, using DOT garages as staging areas allowed the SEOC to push resources 
into regions not yet hit by floods and aided in mitigation efforts.  FEMA had established 
staging areas in Iowa, including a FedEx depot that became a potable water hub during 
the flood response operations.  HSEMD has indicated that it plans to evaluate suitable 
staging areas and possible warehouses that might be used for this purpose. 
Recommendations:  
1. Develop a formal agreement for use of DOT facilities as staging areas during 
incidents. 
2. Develop informational sheets on DOT facilities for use in the SEOC. 
3. Explore options for identifying, purchasing, and/or leasing warehouses for pre-
staging of resources. 
4. Explore options for leveraging private sector warehouses that possess the 
appropriate equipment and resources. 
 
Observation 2.4.3: Strength: Cooperation between the SEOC, DOT, SIP, and the private 
sector proved highly effective for ensuring acquisition and transport of resources. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics 
2. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Transport, Track, and Manage Resources 
i. Task: Deploy and transport resources to appropriate, pre-
determined locations (Res.B1d 7.2) 
Analysis: DOT was a critical partner in transporting needed resources to impacted 
areas.  The National Guard was highly effective in transporting resources until a shortage 
of staff caused it to focus on other missions.  Several non-state entities provided resource 
coordination and transportation on behalf of the state.  FEMA provided crucial help in 
obtaining scarce commodities, such as portable generators for regions without power.  
SIP requested materials and volunteers for resource transportation from the private sector.  
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SIP also contacted private sector trucking partners who mobilized and assisted in the 
transport of resources to impacted areas.  
Recommendation:  
1. Strengthen relationship and procedures with SIP. 
 
Observation 2.4.4: Strength: Tracking resources by serial number proved critical to 
maintaining visibility. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex E: Logistics 
2. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Transport, Track, and Manage Resources 
i. Task: Track the deployment, movement, and transportation of 
resources prior to and during an incident (Res.B1d 7.3)  
Analysis: The 2008 Summer Storms presented opportunities to refine processes for 
tracking deployed resources.  Shortly after flooding began, pump vendors flew to Iowa 
and briefed the Logistics Section staff about serial numbers and pump types.  This 
enabled the Section staff members to categorize pumps that were deployed to the field 
more efficiently and specifically.  This also facilitated the return of the pumps to the 
agencies that owned them.  Vendors suggested that there should be a way to update the 
location of materials in transit with Global Positioning System tracking and emphasized 
the importance of creating a serial number database for resources. 
Recommendation:  
1. Consider modifying WebEOC to accommodate tracking of commodities by serial 
number. 
 
Observation 2.4.5: Area for Improvement: The SEOC lacks a system and protocol for 
tracking state resources once they have been provided to localities.  
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex C: Resource Management  
2. Target Capabilities List, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish plans and systems for acquiring and ordering 
resources (Res.B1d 1.2) 
b. Activity: Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Operations 
i. Task: Identify existing internal, jurisdiction-specific resources 
available to support response and recovery operations (Res.B1d 
3.2.2) 
Analysis: During the 2008 Summer Storms, localities sometimes turned to the state for 
aid before they had exhausted their own resources.  In some cases, localities requested 
state resources that could have been more readily supplied by local distributors.  The 
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SEOC had difficulty tracking these state resources once they had been provided to the 
counties.  In some cases, recoverable resources were lost and not returned to the state.  A 
comprehensive system that could track resources even after they have been provided to 
localities would help to address this problem.  Such a solution would require the 
development of SOPs and subsequent training for local officials.      
Recommendation:  
1. Continue to develop training and guidance for county emergency managers on 
resource request protocols. 
 
2.5  Information Sharing and Communications 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITIES: Communications 
 Emergency Operations Center Management 
 On-Site Incident Management 
 
The SEOC encountered a range of information sharing and communications challenges during 
the 2008 Summer Storms.  These can be grouped into two types of challenges.  First, the SEOC 
had difficulty with internal processes and technologies due to the number of Sections and staff 
members in the expanded SEOC.  Second, the SEOC faced challenges communicating with on-
site managers, local officials, and SEOC assets in the field.  Overall, the magnitude and 
complexity of the Summer Storms made information sharing and communications more difficult, 
which hampered the state’s ability to maintain situational awareness.   
 
2.5.1  SEOC Internal Information Sharing and Communications 
 
In previous SEOC activations, all key personnel were located in the Operations Section at the Pit 
Table.  By working in the same area, these personnel interacted directly with each other, which 
minimized potential internal communication and information sharing challenges.  It also enabled 
them to share a COP.  However, during the 2008 Summer Storms, these internal information 
sharing and communication methods proved insufficient to meet the demands presented by the 
activation of additional SEOC sections, the influx of agency representatives, and the scale of 
activities. 
 
Observation 2.5.1.1: Area for Improvement: SEOC information sharing and 
communication processes had difficulty accommodating the influx of agency representatives and 
the activation of Logistics and Planning Sections. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop supplemental and back-up communications and 
information technology plans, procedures, and systems (ComC 
1.6) 
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ii. Task: Design reliable, redundant, and robust communications 
systems for daily operations capable of quickly reconstituting 
normal operations in the event of disruption or destruction (ComC 
1.4) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish operational and redundant communications 
systems for EOC operation (Res.B1c 1.3) 
Analysis: The activation of the Planning and Logistics Sections, as well as the influx of 
additional staff members from federal and state agencies, caused the SEOC to expand 
beyond the main operations area at the Pit Table.  SEOC staff relied on landline phones, 
Section phones, and entries on WebEOC to address questions they would have previously 
addressed through face-to-face interactions.  These information sharing and 
communication methods each had disadvantages.  Utilizing landline phones to 
communicate internally tied up phone lines that were otherwise needed for external 
communications with county and local jurisdictions.  Turning to Section phones 
mitigated this issue, but the core SEOC Operations Section area in the basement of the 
facility lacked consistent Section phone coverage.  While WebEOC was useful for 
exchanging distinct pieces of information, it is not designed to be used as a direct 
communications tool to share real-time information or to discuss questions (for more on 
WebEOC, see Section 2.2.7.2, WebEOC).  Further, the SEOC lacked a protocol or SOP 
that could guide information sharing across the sections.  Without a protocol or SOP, 
there was no systematic manner for sections to identify and share their critical 
information requirements.   
Recommendations:  
1. Develop an SEOC information sharing protocol or SOP, which should include 
processes for identifying and communicating critical information requirements. 
2. Conduct training for all HSEMD, agency, and other personnel on the information 
sharing and communications SOPs and protocols.  
3. Conduct a TTX that focuses on information sharing and management processes.  
TTX participants should include the Executive Office, all SEOC Sections, 
supporting functions such as the JIC, and other entities likely to send 
representatives during an activation, such as SIP. 
4. Explore the development a redundant system for internal SEOC communications. 
 
Observation 2.5.1.2: Area for Improvement: The location of the Logistics and Planning 
Sections presented information sharing and communication challenges that hampered overall 
situational awareness. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
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i. Task: Develop supplemental and back-up communications and 
information technology plans, procedures, and systems (ComC 
1.6) 
b. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Establish operational and redundant communications 
systems for EOC operation (Res.B1c 1.3) 
b. Activity: Support and Coordinate Response 
i. Task: Coordinate resource logistics and distribution (Res.B1c 8.3) 
Analysis: As described above (see Section 2.2.2, Planning Section), the Planning 
Section did not operate from a fixed location, which presented difficulties communicating 
and sharing information with other Sections.  Similarly, the Logistics Section, located a 
floor above the Operations Section, faced physical barriers to communication, which 
were not addressed by established SEOC communications systems and processes.  The 
Logistics Section staff members needed to understand the overall situation in the state in 
order to establish priorities for resource acquisition and distribution.  To overcome this 
problem, the Logistics Section used a runner to communicate with and to relay 
information from the Operations Section.  While useful, this tactic proved to be time-
consuming and insufficient for ensuring full situational awareness.  On occasion, the 
Logistics Section coordinator called or visited the Operations Section in person; this also 
proved to be time-consuming, and internal calls tied up phone lines otherwise used for 
calls from the field.  The Logistics Section also became detached from long-term 
planning due to a lack of contact with the Planning Section.  As the floods progressed 
toward the southeast, the Planning Section began holding briefings with the Logistics 
staff.  These meetings allowed the Logistics Section to prioritize resources based upon 
future road closures, counties that were likely to be flooded next, and areas with critical 
infrastructure. 
Recommendations:  
1. Ensure that each SEOC Section has a direct line of communication with the other 
Sections. 
2. Ensure that information sharing SOPs and protocols address situations when 
Sections are not located in same area. 
 
Observation 2.5.1.3: Area for Improvement: Increased coordination between SEOC 
Sections and with the JIC is necessary to ensure full situational awareness. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
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a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Coordinate communications policy and procedure across 
response entities (ComC 5.4) 
ii. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
Analysis: The failure to maintain a COP among SEOC sections contributed to 
miscommunication and misallocation of time and resources.  On one occasion, the 
Executive Office received information from field reports and determined that the water 
system in Columbus Junction could not be saved.  However, this decision was not 
communicated to the Operations Section.  As a result, Operations Section staff devoted 
most of an evening and night attempting to save the water system.  This incident had a 
negative effect on morale and diverted manpower from other critical tasks.   
 
In some cases, the JIC had information that the Operation Section did not have.  Further, 
PIOs searched WebEOC and gathered information from SEOC partners as the Executive 
Office Support Staff looked for the same information as it prepared briefings for the 
Executive Office.  Both the JIC and the Executive Office Support Staff had to brief the 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, but they often had different information.  
Coordination and information sharing is needed between all Sections in the EOC to 
ensure resources are utilized as effectively as possible.   
Recommendations:  
1. Ensure that protocols and SOPs address information sharing and communications 
between the Executive Office and SEOC Sections. 
2. Establish processes for coordinating information that is being provided to the 
Executive Office. 
3. Identify the SEOC Section or individuals responsible for providing critical 
information requirements to the Executive Office. 
4. Research alternate means of communications, e.g. radios.  
 
Observation 2.5.1.4: Area for Improvement: There is a need for improved coordination 
between the SEOC and the National Guard. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Coordinate communications policy and procedure across 
response entities (ComC 5.4) 
ii. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
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3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Task: Conduct EOC/MACC/IOF specific training (Res.B1c 2.1) 
b. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (ResB1c 
5.2.2) 
Analysis: The Operations Section experienced challenges in joint planning with the 
National Guard and the Joint Operations Center (JOC).  Agencies failed to send 
personnel to planning meetings scheduled by HSEMD, which prevented them from 
representing their interests and from sharing information.  National Guard staff members 
did not always pass information to the SEOC Operations Section due to the lack of a 
dedicated National Guard staff member trained in SEOC protocols.  This became 
especially problematic in mission assignments and fulfillments, as the Operations Section 
often lacked information about National Guard missions in the field.  The National Guard 
acknowledged the communications gap between the JOC and the Operations Section.  It 
has begun to develop a Military Support of Civil Authorities Section that will be co-
located within the SEOC to coordinate with the Operations Section in future incidents.   
Recommendations:  
1. Ensure that National Guard officers assigned to work with the SEOC have the 
necessary training to fulfill their coordination roles. 
2. Train National Guard operations officers on WebEOC and its capabilities.  
 
Observation 2.5.1.5: Area for Improvement: SEOC-wide briefings were not held on a 
regular schedule, preventing the maintenance of a COP. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (ResB1c 
5.2.2) 
4. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Execute Plan 
i. Task: Disseminate IAPs to other response organizations through 
operational briefings. 
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Analysis: Internal briefings for SEOC staff did not occur on a regular schedule, which 
prevented staff members from maintaining a situational awareness.  The SEOC 
established a schedule for daily briefings at the start of the Summer Storms.  However, 
the schedule slipped as the incident became more complex and affected more areas.  One 
SEOC officer pointed to the joint field office (JFO) as a model for internal briefings.  The 
JFO held daily 30-minute meetings on a set schedule; these meetings allowed staff 
members to receive updates on operations in all areas of the recovery effort and on what 
each section had planned for the day or week.  Differences between a JFO and an 
activated EOC may make it difficult for the SEOC to adopt this model fully.  Further, 
internal updates sometimes did not provide an accurate overview of the situation.  In such 
cases, a quick update on the situation would have been more helpful, along with any 
quick updates from the state agencies.      
Recommendations:  
1. Establish and maintain regular SEOC-wide briefings to promote a situational 
awareness within the SEOC. 
2. Identify what should be reported during the briefings.  
3. Develop a template on briefing needs to give guidance to state agencies. 
 
2.5.2  Communication with County Emergency Management 
Coordinators 
 
The SEOC is responsible for maintaining communications with county and local jurisdictions.  
During small-scale incidents, an SEOC operations officer is assigned to a specific county for the 
duration so all communications from that county come to a single point of contact.  During the 
2008 Summer Storms, the SEOC had to coordinate operations involving an unusually high 
number of field assets and impacted areas.  The number of affected counties strained standard 
communication processes between the SEOC and counties.   
 
Observation 2.5.2.1: Area for Improvement: The magnitude and scope of the 2008 
Summer Storms hampered SEOC communications with counties and local jurisdictions. 
References: 
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex A: Direction, Control, and Coordination 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop procedures for the exchange of voice and data with 
federal, regional, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as 
voluntary agencies (ComC 1.2.1) 
3. Target Capabilities List, On-Site Incident Management 
a. Activity: Establish Full On-Site Incident Command 
i. Task: Maintain communications with EOC/MACC (Res.B1a 
4.2.1.1) 
4. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
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a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate emergency management efforts among local, 
county, regional, state, and federal EOC/MACC/IOF (Res.B1c 
5.2.2) 
Analysis: During the Summer Storms, communications with local jurisdictions 
depended on county managers taking the initiative to inform the SEOC of their situations 
and resource needs.  Many county emergency management coordinators could not 
extricate themselves from response operations long enough to provide periodic situation 
updates to the SEOC.  This produced a lack of situational awareness, including regarding 
the use and status of resources delivered by the SEOC for flood response and mitigation.  
The SEOC developed the field liaison concept to address this need.  Additional training 
on WebEOC for county emergency management coordinators would be beneficial (see 
Systems, Section 2.2.7). 
Recommendation: 
1. Conduct outreach to county emergency management coordinators on maintaining 
communications with the SEOC. 
 
Observation 2.5.2.2: Area for Improvement: There is no established protocol for notifying 
a county when it has been included in a disaster or emergency declaration. 
References:  
1. Iowa Code 29C.6 
2. Target Capabilities List, Communications 
a. Activity: Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support 
i. Task: Maintain a COP for real-time sharing of information with all 
the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are 
working from the same information (ComC 5.5) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Ensure appropriate notifications are made (Res.B1c 5.2.4) 
Analysis: The Governor issued 86 disaster proclamations in response to the 2008 
Summer Storms.  President Bush issued a Major Disaster Declaration (FEMA-1763-DR), 
which made residents in 84 counties eligible for PA and in 78 counties for IA.  However, 
there is no established protocol for notifying a county that the Governor has declared a 
disaster.  In fact, many county emergency managers first found out that their county had 
been covered by a disaster proclamation through media inquiries.   
Recommendation:  
1. Establish SOPs to ensure that county coordinators will be notified when their 
counties are included in a disaster or emergency declaration.   
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2.6  Public Information 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning 
 
The Governor’s Office, supported by HSEMD, is primarily responsible for the dissemination of 
public emergency information through media briefings and press releases. 22  Other 
organizations, such as the National Weather Service and county-level emergency management 
agencies, are responsible for public warnings at the local level.  Effective public information is 
essential to provide citizens with information about the incident, the status of response efforts, 
and protective action guidance for affected communities.  The Governor’s Office and PIOs 
coordinate state emergency public information through the JIC.  According to the Iowa 
Emergency Response Plan, the state makes every effort to form a single JIC for all state and 
federal agencies at the SEOC during an incident.23  HSEMD typically has three full-time PIOs, 
including the Communications Bureau Chief, who are augmented with other HSEMD staff 
members to activate and operate the JIC.   
 
Prior to the 2008 Summer Storms, HSEMD revised the Public Information Annex of the Iowa 
Emergency Response Plan to institute three levels of JIC activity.  The tiered response is based 
upon the severity of the incident: Level 1 involves only the HSEMD officers, Level 2 involves 
HSEMD and state agencies on the executive committee, and Level 3 calls for “all hands on 
deck” during a major statewide incident.  While these activity levels did not exist during the 
2007 winter storms, the JIC operated at the equivalent of a Level 1 or 2 activation.  JIC PIOs 
trained for Level 1 activation prior to the 2008 Summer Storms but had not used the activation 
concept extensively at the time of the storms.    
 
The JIC activated in response to the tornado that devastated the Parkersburg area on May 25.  
The incident involved eight fatalities, generating 
national media attention and an intense demand for 
information during the first few days.  The attention 
from local and regional media continued for the 
remainder of the week.  The JIC increased its 
activation to Level 3 after the flooding began.  
FEMA deployed a PIO to support the JIC who 
capably addressed all FEMA-related questions from 
the media.  The Governor’s Office supplied two 
dedicated staff members to coordinate and approve 
media releases within the JIC.  The JIC successfully 
operated with five core staff members plus surge 
support when needed.   
Figure 11 – A Media Conference with FEMA 
Administrator David Paulison 
 
                                                 
22 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
I: Public Information, 28 Mar 2003, p. I-1. 
 
23 Ibid., p. I-5. 
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Observation 2.6.1: Area for Improvement: In some cases, the state’s response operations 
were adversely impacted by the absence of trained local PIOs to meet the demands for public 
information.   
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex I: Public Information 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Public Information and Warning 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Develop and implement public information, alert/warning, and 
notification training and exercise programs (Res.B1f 2.2) 
b. Activity: Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and 
Notification Plans 
i. Task: Assign a PIO (Res.B1f 4.2.1) 
c. Activity: Establish a JIC 
i. Task: Coordinate the provision of timely and accurate emergency 
public information through the Joint Information System (Res.B1f 
5.1.1) 
ii. Task: Coordinate among JICs at all levels of government (Res.B1f 
6.2.2) 
Analysis: Many localities lacked trained PIOs, which hampered communication with 
the JIC and prevented full coordination of public messaging.  This forced untrained local 
personnel to step in and fill the gap.  In one case, HSEMD sent a state PIO to work with 
the locality and to help perform the public information mission.  HSEMD received 
funding from DHS to conduct PIO training workshops in rural areas before the 2008 
Summer Storms.  Extending PIO training in rural areas can help improve local capacity 
to handle media requests and emergency public information.  By strengthening local PIO 
capacity, the state can help to ensure more effective support to localities during future 
disasters.   
Recommendation:   
1. Identify and train a local PIO in every county and major city. 
 
Observation 2.6.2: Strength: The SEOC utilized call centers to answer general questions 
and to receive offers from persons wishing to volunteer.  
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex I: Public Information 
2. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Public Information and Warning 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
i. Develop and implement public information, alert/warning, and 
notification training and exercise programs (Res.B1f 2.2) 
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b. Activity: Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and 
Notification Plans 
i. Task: Assign a PIO (Res.B1f 4.2.1) 
Analysis: In the aftermath of the Parkersburg tornado, citizens from around the state 
attempted to obtain information about the incident.  The SEOC directed calls to the Iowa 
Concern Hotline, a phone center located in Des Moines which is affiliated with Iowa 
State University.  HSEMD used the call center for disaster information through a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the university.  The Iowa Concern Hotline 
answered more than 300 phone inquiries in the first 24 hours of operation on May 29.  
Several weeks later, as flooding intensified, the HSEMD Communications Bureau Chief 
activated a secondary call center within the State Building complex.  The alternative call 
center was a resource for the Governor’s Office and other state agencies to supplement 
existing staff capability.  A HSEMD staff member coordinated this alternative call center, 
with three other state employees trained in frequently asked questions about the flood 
recovery.      
Recommendations:   
1. Continue to utilize the Iowa Concern Hotline, and establish other call centers as 
needed. 
2. Review and formalize MOUs used for activating a call center.  
 
2.7  Mass Care 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITY: Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related 
Services) 
 
Under the Iowa Emergency Response Plan, the Iowa Department of Human Services holds 
primary responsibility for coordinating sheltering operations in Iowa.  The ARC is responsible 
for operating and managing emergency shelters in most communities.  The Department of 
Human Services provides assistance to the ARC and local officials for shelter operations.   
 
Observation 2.7.1: Area for Improvement: Existing plans and agreements did not provide 
the SEOC with adequate visibility into sheltering operations.   
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex K: Sheltering. 
2. Target Capabilities List, Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services)  
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop plans, policies, and procedures for the provision of 
mass care services to general populations in coordination with all 
responsible agencies (Res.C3a 1.3) 
ii. Task: Enter pre-identified shelter facilities into the National Shelter 
System (NSS) (Res.C3a 1.2.7) 
b. Activity: Direct Mass Care Operations 
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i. Task: Disseminate accurate, timely, and accessible information to 
the public, media, support agencies, and vendors about mass care 
services (Res.C3a 3.8.1) 
c. Activity: Establish Shelter Operations 
i. Task: Coordinate provision of shelter support services with 
appropriate agencies (Res.C3a 5.4) 
Analysis: Coordination of sheltering operations during the 2008 Summer Storms did 
not proceed in accordance with the Iowa Emergency Response Plan.  Prior to the 
Summer Storms, it was decided that Iowa would use FEMA’s NSS, a Web-based 
program to track information on shelter location, managing agency, capacity, and current 
population.  However, once the Summer Storms began, shelter data was not populated 
into the NSS.  For the two weeks following the Parkersburg tornado, a representative 
from the state ARC chapter staffed the ARC desk in the SEOC and remained in close 
contact with Department of Human Services representatives at the SEOC.  However, in 
some instances, neither ARC nor non-ARC shelter operators informed the SEOC of new 
shelter openings or the status of existing shelters.  Some county-level officials posted 
shelter information on WebEOC.  However, this practice did not occur with sufficient 
frequency to provide situational awareness to the SEOC. 
Consequently, the SEOC and the Department of Human Services had extremely limited 
visibility into both ARC and non-ARC shelter operations throughout the Summer 
Storms.  This resulted from the failure to utilize the NSS as planned as well as a 
breakdown in communications among the state, local EOCs, local shelter operations, and 
the ARC.  Consequently, the SEOC could neither identify nor mitigate potential resource 
shortages at non-ARC shelters across the state.  At times, the Department of Human 
Services desk at the SEOC only became informed of a non-ARC shelter’s existence when 
it required emergency assistance from the state.  ARC shelters did not request or require 
state assistance. 
Communications between the SEOC and ARC deteriorated after the initial two weeks of 
operations as personnel from the National ARC replaced the state chapter representative 
and communicated sheltering information solely through the JFO.  This forced the SEOC 
to rely on Department of Human Services representatives at the JFO to forward 
information on shelter locations and capacities to the SEOC. 
Recommendations:  
1. Develop SOPs for gathering sheltering operations plans and information. 
2. Review options for alternative shelter providers. 
3. Strengthen awareness among all relevant stakeholders of the importance of 
utilizing the NSS during disasters.  This should be reinforced through the 
development of SOPs for populating data into the NSS. 
 
Observation 2.7.2: Area for Improvement: Existing mass care plans and processes do not 
sufficiently address special needs populations. 
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References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex K: Sheltering 
2. Target Capabilities List, Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) 
a. Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems 
i. Task: Develop plans, policies, and procedures to address common 
issues (e.g. cultural, language, people with disabilities, etc.) as part 
of the mass care service delivery (Res.C3a 1.3.1) 
Analysis: Sheltering operations during the 2008 Summer Storms did not address special 
needs.  Residents with special needs remained in general shelters or transferred to 
medical shelters.  Shelters housing residents with medical needs did not immediately 
notify the Department of Human Services and DPH, which prevented the state from 
offering additional support to such shelters.  For example, DPH personnel arriving at a 
Linn County shelter learned that 21 of the 72 people there needed continuous medical 
care.  DPH then deployed medical care to the shelter for 12 days.  Iowa would benefit 
from the development of a functional definition of “special needs” as it revises its plans. 
Recommendation:  
1. Develop plans that define “special needs” and provide for special needs shelters 
during incidents. 
 
2.8  Volunteer and Donations Management 
 
ASSOCIATED TARGET CAPABILITIES: Volunteer Management and Donations 
 Management 
 
The Iowa Emergency Response Plan calls for a designated donations management coordinator 
and a volunteer management coordinator to conduct needs assessments and to act as the points of 
contact for all donations and volunteers during an incident.  During SEOC activations, the 
donations and volunteer management positions are usually combined into a single role.  The 
Donations and Volunteer Management function requires frequent interaction with the Resource 
Management function.24  This includes cooperation with staff members from the SEOC 
Planning, Logistics, and Operations Sections.25  The donations and volunteer manager is also 
responsible for interfacing with external groups, including the general public, the private sector, 
and non-governmental organizations such as the Iowa Disaster Human Resource Council 
(IDHRC), Food Bank Iowa, and the Iowa Concern Hotline.26          
 
Observation 2.8.1: Strength: Including a representative from SIP in the SEOC proved 
invaluable for soliciting and coordinating private sector involvement in the response. 
                                                 
24 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
C: Resource Management, 28 Mar 2003. 
25 Safeguard Iowa Partnership, Iowa Disasters: Tornadoes, Flooding and Other Severe Weather After-Action 
Report, 2008, p. 9. 
 
26 Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, Part A; Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex 
C: Resource Management; Attachment 1: Donations/Volunteer Management, 28 Mar 2003, p. C-11. 
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References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex C: Resource Management 
2. Target Capabilities List, Volunteer Management and Donations 
a. Activity: Coordinate Volunteer Management Operations and the 
Establishment of Warehouses and Materials Handling Equipment 
i. Task: Collaborate with other agencies/organizations/businesses 
regarding volunteers and donations (Res.B1e 3.5.3) 
b. Activity: Coordinate Distribution of Donations 
i. Task: Manage surge in unsolicited donations and in-kind materials 
(Res.B1e 8.2) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operations 
i. Task: Include Business Operations Center capability within state 
EOCs (Res.B1c 3.7.1) 
b. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate with non-governmental agencies and/or the 
private sector to collect/share data on the incident situation 
(Res.B1c 5.2.3) 
Analysis: During the incident, the SEOC combined the responsibilities of the donations 
management coordinator and the volunteer management coordinator into a single 
management position.  This position was initially filled by an HSEMD staff member who 
was also the SEOC Operations Chief.  However, the scale of the response and recovery 
operations during the Summer Storms necessitated a dedicated staff position for 
donations and volunteer management to effectively coordinate aid from the public and 
private sector entities.  As the magnitude and complexity of the incident grew, the SEOC 
Operations Chief transferred the volunteer and donations management responsibilities to 
the SIP director.27  In this capacity, the director coordinated all donation requests from 
both the private and public sectors (see Staffing, Section 2.2.6).  The director worked 
with the SEOC Operations Chief and the IDHRC to implement the National Donations 
Management System (NDMS) (i.e. Aidmatrix) and to help train users on the system.  
Utilizing the NDMS enabled the SEOC to manage successfully the large volume of 
donations from across the state and nation.    
 
The director utilized her private sector contacts to solicit donations and emergency 
resources needed for the response efforts.  SIP coordinated with national retail chains to 
acquire forklifts, sand, and poly-plastics at critical times during the response operations.  
SIP also aided the Logistics Section in its efforts to distribute resources by recruiting 
private truck companies to transport flood mitigation materials.  This provided a valuable 
supplement to the transportation effort undertaken by the DPS and DOT.   
 
                                                 
 
27 SIP is a private-public coalition that endeavors to strengthen Iowa’s capacity to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from disasters through the integration of business resources, expertise, and response plans. 
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HSEMD has recently hired a staff person who will be dedicated to working with 
volunteer and donations management issues as needed during large-scale events.  While 
the private sector has resources to offer, it will not be tasked with the lead role.  
Recommendations: 
1. Revise and enhance procedures for coordination of volunteer and donations 
management efforts.    
2. Incorporate private sector partners into volunteer and donations management 
efforts. 
 
Observation 2.8.2: Area for Improvement: The SEOC lacks institutionalized relationships 
with critical private sector and volunteer organizations. 
References:  
1. Iowa Emergency Response Plan, Annex C: Resource Management 
2. Target Capabilities List, Volunteer Management and Donations 
a. Activity: Coordinate Volunteer Management Operations and the 
Establishment of Warehouses and Materials Handling Equipment 
i. Task: Collaborate with other agencies/organizations/businesses 
regarding volunteers and donations (Res.B1e 3.5.3) 
3. Target Capabilities List, Emergency Operations Center Management 
a. Activity: Direct Emergency Operations Center’s Tactical Operations 
i. Task: Include Business Operations Center capability within state 
EOCs (Res.B1c 3.7.1) 
b. Activity: Gather and Provide Information 
i. Task: Coordinate with non-governmental agencies and/or the 
private sector to collect/share data on the incident situation 
(Res.B1c 5.2.3) 
Analysis: Private sector and volunteer 
organizations provided essential support 
to SEOC operations, including resource 
acquisition, resource staging, and 
sheltering.  The SEOC Operations 
Section maintained close contact with the 
IDHRC throughout the response period.  
The IDHRC serves as the state Voluntary 
Organization Active in Disasters and had 
a representative at the SEOC for several 
days.  Still, the SEOC lacked 
institutionalized relationships with many 
private sector and volunteer 
organizations.  For example, Serve the City provided a staging area in Cedar Rapids to 
help coordinate the distribution of drinkable water.  When the staging area POC turned 
off his Section phone, the SEOC Logistics Section had no alternative contact number or 
Figure 12 – An American Red Cross Volunteer 
Distributes Water in the Town of Waverly 
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secondary POC to contact.  This effectively cut off the Section from coordinating the 
activity at that water distribution site when they received an urgent request for supplies.  
Further, many Iowa businesses relied on SIP as their POC at the SEOC, as they had no 
designated state or local POCs for donations or resource coordination.  This was apparent 
following the Parkersburg tornado when Iowa Telecom attempted to offer its capabilities 
to aid the town but, in the absence of a SEOC contact, instead contacted the SIP director.   
Recommendations:  
1. Develop a list of POCs within volunteer organizations and businesses that support 
response operations. 
2. Conduct outreach to volunteer organizations and businesses on procedures and 
POCs for coordinating resource requests and donations. 
3. Continue to involve IDHRC members in both response and recovery efforts for 
the coordination of volunteers and donations. 
4. Further define the role of IDHRC during response and recovery phases to include 
SEOC staffing. 
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SECTION 3: CONCLUSION 
The 2008 Summer Storms constituted Iowa’s greatest natural disaster in years, equaling or 
exceeding the damages of the 1993 floods.  Iowa emergency management and homeland security 
officials were confronted with a series of severe storms, tornadoes, and floods that presented an 
enormously complex incident environment.  Iowa’s incident managers had to operate on a 
greater scale and for a longer time than they had in any recent exercises or incidents.  At the peak 
of incident operations, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division 
(HSEMD) and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) staff members were conducting 
simultaneous response, mitigation, recovery, and preparedness operations. 
 
HSEMD implemented a series of measures during the Summer Storms that enabled the SEOC to 
manage incident operations, to coordinate with the counties, and to incorporate additional 
federal, state, and private sector agency representatives into the SEOC.  These steps succeeded, 
in part, because HSEMD had begun to implement the lessons learned from the 2007 winter 
storms.  The use of a Planning Section and an Executive Office Support Staff and the increased 
situational awareness can be traced to the actions undertaken by HSEMD between the winter and 
Summer Storms.  Other innovations, particularly the Iowa Incident Management Team and field 
liaisons, demonstrated their contributions to enhancing the SEOC’s ability to manage incidents 
and to support local efforts.  Together, these measures saved lives, mitigated damages, and 
facilitated the transition from response to recovery operations.  Behind these measures are the 
dedicated emergency responders and homeland security personnel who worked selflessly during 
the incident to help their fellow Iowans. 
   
This after-action report (AAR) has identified a series of recommendations that are designed to 
formalize and institutionalize the improvements taken by the HSEMD and SEOC.  In many 
respects, these recommendations extend the lessons learned from the 2007 winter storms and can 
help prepare Iowa to manage future complex incidents.  Through these recommendations, the 
SEOC can continue to refine its plans, standard operating procedures, technologies, and systems. 
 
Finally, other states and localities would benefit from careful consideration of the observations, 
analysis, and recommendations contained in this AAR.  The AAR illustrates the difficulties that 
will confront jurisdictions during complex incidents.  Iowa’s experience during the 2008 
Summer Storms can make an important contribution to preparedness across the nation. 
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APPENDIX A: LESSONS LEARNED 
The Department of Homeland Security maintains the Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
(LLIS.gov) system as a means of sharing lessons learned and innovative practices with the 
emergency response and homeland security community. 
 
LLIS.gov uses the following categories and definitions for its documents: 
 
 Lesson Learned: Knowledge and experience, positive or negative, derived from actual 
incidents, such as the September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina, as well as those 
derived from observations and historical study of operations, training, and exercises. 
 Best Practice: Exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or 
solutions that work and are solidly grounded in actual operations, training, and exercise 
experience. 
 Good Story: Exemplary, but non-peer-validated, initiatives (implemented by various 
jurisdictions) that have shown success in their specific environments and that may 
provide useful information to other communities and organizations. 
 Practice Note: A brief description of innovative practices, procedures, methods, 
programs, or tactics that an organization uses to adapt to changing conditions or to 
overcome an obstacle or challenge. 
 
The following issues have been identified for inclusion on the LLIS.gov network.   
 
Lessons Learned 
 
 Disaster and Emergency Declarations: Establishing Procedures for Informing Affected 
Localities  
 Emergency Communications: Notifying Local Jurisdictions about State Teams before 
Deployment 
 Emergency Operations Centers: Cataloguing Staff Skill Sets  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Configuring WebEOC   
 Emergency Operations Centers: Delegating Critical Roles during Incidents  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Developing a Guidebook for Managing and Tracking 
Resources  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Developing a Surge Capacity for Information 
Technology Support Staff 
 Emergency Operations Centers: Developing Information Sharing Protocols or Standard 
Operating Procedures 
 Emergency Operations Centers: Ensuring Direct Communication among Sections  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Maintaining Regular Internal Briefings to Promote 
Situational Awareness   
 Emergency Operations Centers: Managing Shift Lengths during Large-Scale or 
Prolonged Activations 
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 Emergency Operations Centers: Planning Section Standard Operating Procedures and 
Operational Guidance 
 Emergency Operations Centers: Posting Shift Assignments 
 Emergency Operations Centers: Using Commodity-Based Logistics Management 
 Emergency Operations Centers: WebEOC Training  
 Mass Care: Developing Standard Operating Procedures for Gathering Shelter Information  
 Volunteer Management: Transporting Volunteers from a Staging Area to an Incident Site  
 
Practice Notes 
 
 Emergency Management: Iowa’s Development of Incident Management Teams 
 Emergency Management: The Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Division Logistics Section’s Use of a WebEOC Spotter to Monitor Internal Tasks 
 Emergency Management: The Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Division’s Deployment of Field Liaisons to Increase Situational Awareness  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Iowa State Emergency Operations Center’s Executive 
Office Support Staff  
 Emergency Operations Centers: Iowa State Emergency Operations Center’s Use of a 
Planning Section 
 Exercise Planning: The State of Iowa’s Exercise Working Group 
 Public Information: Iowa Department of Transportation’s Call Center 
 Public Information: Iowa’s Weather Radio Program 
 Recovery Operations: Iowa Department of Public Safety’s Use of Identification Bracelets 
at Incident Sites 
 Resource Management: Iowa Department of Transportation’s Staging Areas  
 Resource Management: The Iowa State Emergency Operations Center’s Coordination of 
Private Sector Resources 
 
Good Stories 
 
 State of Iowa’s Incident Management Teams  
 The Safeguard Iowa Partnership 
 
 
Appendix A: Lessons Learned  71  
 
Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report  27 April 2009 
APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS 
 
Acronym Meaning 
AAR After-Action Report 
ACAMS Automated Critical Asset Management System 
ARC American Red Cross 
CI Critical Infrastructure 
COP Common Operating Picture 
DAS Iowa Department of Administrative Services 
DHS US Department of Homeland Security 
DNR Iowa Department of Natural Resources 
DOT Iowa Department of Transportation 
DPH Iowa Department of Public Health 
DPS Iowa Department of Public Safety 
EF Enhanced Fujita 
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 
HSEMD Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division 
IA Individual Assistance  
IA-IMT Iowa Incident Management Team 
IAP Incident Action Plan 
ICS Incident Command System 
IDHRC Iowa Disaster Human Resource Council 
IMT Incident Management Team 
IOF Initial Operating Facility 
IT Information Technology 
ITE Information Technology Enterprise 
JFO Joint Field Office 
JIC Joint Information Center 
JOC Joint Operations Center 
KR Key Resources 
LLIS.gov Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
MACC Multi-Agency Coordination Center 
MN-IMT Minnesota Incident Management Team 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NDMS National Donations Management System 
NIMS National Incident Management System 
NSS National Shelter System 
PA Public Assistance 
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PIO Public Information Officer 
POC Point of Contact 
RNAT Rapid Needs Assessment Team 
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center 
SIP Safeguard Iowa Partnership 
SITREP Situation Report 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics 
TTX Tabletop Exercise 
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